論文

査読有り
2019年1月

Fair criteria for social decisions under uncertainty

Journal of Mathematical Economics

80
開始ページ
77
終了ページ
87
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
出版者・発行元
ELSEVIER

In a simple model where agents have ordinal and interpersonally noncomparable subjective expected utility preferences over uncertain future incomes, we analyze the implications of equity, efficiency, separability, and social rationality. Our efficiency conditions are fairly weak, because there are criticisms on the standard ex ante Pareto principle in the literature.Our social welfare criteria from the axioms satisfy ex ante equity, but violate Statewise Dominance, often referred to as ”the minimal criterion” of rationality under uncertainty.

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