NIHU Area Studies Project for the
Modern Middle East

SIAS.
Working Paper Series
38.

Muslims in the Globalizing World

Some Reflections on Japan

Edited by
SAWAE Fumiko

上智大学 イスラーム研究センター
Center for Islamic Studies,
Sophia University

NIHU Area Studies Project for the Modern Middle East
Center for Islamic Studies,
Sophia University

7-1 Kioi-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-8554, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3238-4073　FAX: +81-3-3238-4074
e-mail: ias-iac@sophia.ac.jp
Website: http://dept.sophia.ac.jp/is/SIAS/

NIHUネットワーク型基幹研究プロジェクト「現代中東地域研究推進事業」
上智大学イスラーム研究センター

〒102-8554 東京都千代田区紀尾井町7-1

Published on February 25, 2022
Printed in Japan

Muslims in the Globalizing World / Some Reflections on Japan,
SIAS Working Paper Series 38

Edited by
SAWAE Fumiko

ISBN 978-4-909070-23-4

Contents

Contributors

SAWAE Fumiko
Professor, Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University.

YAGI Kumiko
Professor, Institute of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

KUSHIMOTO Hiroko
Associate Professor, Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University.

SHIOZAKI Yuki
Associate Professor, School of International Relations, University of Shizuoka.

KOKAKI Aya
Research Fellow, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Chiba University.

ISHIKAWA Shinsaku
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Tohoku Gakuin University.

KWON Hyangsuk
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University.

4. The Failure of Islamism as a Postcolonial Challenger? The Implications of S. Sayyid's Argument for the Turkish Case

SAWAE Fumiko

> [I]s not the Islamic State group a final demonstration that the project of Islamism has reached an intellectual, cultural and moral dead end? If under the banner of Islamism such cruel atrocities can be committed, then what is the point of Islamism? Is not the final irony that political Islam is the betrayal of Islam? [Sayyid 2017: 78]

I. Introduction

Salman Sayyid is an important voice in discussions of Islamism, postcolonialism, and the struggle to reclaim Muslim subjectivity—the ability to set the terms of what it means to be Muslim. Sayyid argues that the raison d'être of Islamism is to decolonize epistemological Western-centrism as a means of overcoming the imperialist and colonialist subjugation that Muslim societies have suffered since the dawn of the modern era [Sayyid 2017: 80]. It is a postcolonial struggle that continues today, an attempt at creating an Islamic-centered political order that will right the wrongs of Western colonial world-making [Sayyid 2015: 17], waged by a broad range of actors in Muslim societies, from extremist groups to democratic actors and political parties [Sayyid 2017: 69]. This includes even groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), whose explicit invocation of the concept of the caliphate—abolished when the Ottoman Empire, which claimed the seat, was replaced by the Western-centered modern state system—has appealed to Muslims oppressed in many parts of the world [Sayyid 2017: 78-81].

Given the diversity of Islamist groups in the world today and the continued appeal of their message, Sayyid maintains, the notion that Islamism has hit a "dead

end" seems off the mark. Not only that, it is dangerous, potentially strengthening the Western-centric view that Islam is evil and civilizationally inferior, and that Islamism should be overcome along with Islam as the source of such evil.

Rather than a "dead end," I suggest that it is better to think of Islamism's having reached a crossroads. As the postcolonial challenge succeeds in casting off or redressing more and more elements of the complex power relations of colonialism, where does it go from there? Though in some ways this is a never-ending challenge, many Islamist groups have made a great deal of progress in overcoming the Western-centric order.

Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), which Sayyid regards as a successful Islamist party, is a case in point. But it is also a fly in the ointment. In its twenty years of governing experience, since 2002, the AKP has waged a remarkably successful struggle against Western-centrism at home and become a leading voice in the struggle against Islamophobia internationally. But while the first half of its rule made it a model of successful Muslim democracy, the past ten years have seen it slide into authoritarianism. Interestingly, the AKP's destructive turn occurred at the very moment that the party seemed on the cusp of breaking new ground on the question of what form postcolonial Islamist politics could take and what it could do. Now, however, the party's own supporters are asking questions much like the ones Sayyid posed about ISIL in the quotation that opened this chapter. If the AKP raises the same doubts about the raison d'être of Islamism as ISIL, this suggests that the real question Islamists of all stripes need to contend with is the form that their postcolonial project ought to take once it has advanced into a world largely freed of the power relations of imperialism.

In the fall of 2017, when Sayyid's article was published, the Erdoğan government in Turkey was in the process of purging its opponents through a program of mass incarceration and public shaming at home and military operations and political arm twisting abroad. Though initially spurred by suicide attacks by leftist Kurdish guerrillas and ISIL, both linked to the Syrian civil war, and intensifying domestic political feuds— including an attempted coup by the Gülenists, an Islamic group and former ally of the AKP—nearly five years have passed since then, and Turkey's authoritarian turn has grown only more marked. The country has

transitioned to a new political system that places vast power in the hands of the president, an office that was once largely ceremonial, and removes the checks and balances on the executive once vested in the parliament and judiciary. Crackdowns on political opponents continue, and criticism of the regime is aggressively suppressed. Rule by presidential fiat, of one-man politics, has become the new norm.

Much as ISIL's barbarity was almost universally condemned by Islamists, many former supporters have turned away from Erdoğan's regime and accused it of actually undermining the cause it once championed. Former party figures have started openly questioning the legitimacy of Erdoğan's methods and defecting [Sawae 2020: 267-270]. A number of high-profile reports in the media claim that young people have started turning away from Islam itself en masse, driven by disillusionment with the Islamist cause after the past decade of AKP rule [Sawae 2020: 267].[1] Ironically, it seems that an Islamist government may be succeeding where earlier generations of stalwart secularists failed, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, revered as the Father of the Nation in Turkey, and the Kemalist elites who inherited his Western-centrism.

In this chapter, based on Salman Sayyid's definition of Islamism, I define Turkey's AKP as an Islamist movement that has sought to overturn the power relations of colonial Western-centrism by challenging its global and local representatives, institutions and elites that assign it and its supporters an inferior status and denigrate their religiosity, their values, and their concerns. After it was first elected to government, the AKP began a long campaign to wrest control of state power from the hands of such figures, especially the military, and it enjoyed broad national support while doing so. But once it succeeded, it began to alienate even the members of its own base, raising questions about both its own legitimacy and the merits of the wider Islamist cause. This chapter sets out to explain how and why this happened; and, in doing so, it will ask how the AKP, as a postcolonial challenger,

[1] A left-wing internet broadcasting station hosted by journalist Ruşen Çakır has repeatedly covered this alleged trend, focusing on children of AKP politicians and supporters who say they have become religious skeptics and atheists under Erdoğan's regime. For a recent program, see *Medyascope TV* [2021]. This theme has also been taken up in many Islamist-leaning newspapers, including both pro-government newspapers like *Yeni Şafak* and opposition outlets like *Karar*, with the blame pinned—sometimes explicitly—on the government's coercive discourse and oppressive politics.

has changed and utilized its epistemological position against Western-centrism/Orientalism. To highlight some of the nuances involved on this point, I juxtapose the strategies employed by the AKP with the epistemological positioning of the Islamic Gülenist group. Both cases reveal the ongoing power and indeed even utility of Western-centrism for Islamism and Islamic groups that are seeking to assert or reclaim their subjectivity, a paradoxical situation that helps account for the difficulty of overcoming Western-centrism in today's world.

II. Islamists' Initial Positioning for Overcoming Global and Local Orientalism

1. Kemalism as Internal Orientalism and Islamism as a Challenger

Turkey has rarely been the subject of so-called postcolonialist studies, as it escaped colonization. However, anti-imperialism is very strong among the people in general, because the Ottoman Empire was dissolved by Western imperial powers after their victory in the First World War, and most of the Muslim-majority areas of the former Ottoman territories were colonized and separated from Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey's founding elite, who sought to create a new nation and people modeled on the state and society of the West, regarded the political and social institutions and traditional Islamic practices that formed the basis of the Ottoman Empire as anachronisms. Instead, they equated Western modern ideals with modern civilization and tried to create a secularized Western state and society. The founding ideology, called Kemalism after Turkey's founding father, captured Islam and the Muslim masses with the Orientalist gaze. Türkmen summarizes it as follows:

> Occidental hegemony is not only perpetuated by Occidental Orientalists, but also by the strategic contribution made by the occidentalized intellectual situated within the Oriental society.
>
> ... The elite would adopt its own subjectivity around the "Occidentalist fantasy," thus distinguishing itself from the "backwards others." In the Occidentalist fantasy, the West is a frozen model and a scrutinizing eye around which the elite constructs itself as an occidentalized watchdog for Turkish

society. [Türkmen 2013: 111-112]

Atatürk, whose defeat of Western and Greek forces in Anatolia after the First World War made possible the creation of an independent Turkey, has been mythologized as a peerless national hero and inviolable symbol of Turkish nationalism. As a result, in addition to its Western-centrism, Kemalism has also always carried a strong anti-imperialist current. As an ideology, Kemalism dominated both the state apparatus of physical violence (the military) and that of soft power (national schooling) from early on, and it remains influential as a major ideology of the Turkish nation-state even today.[2]

"Kemalism" was and is a response to the modern imperialist era in a Muslim-majority society, one that pairs a fierce secularism with a Western-centric and Orientalist gaze [Sayyid 2015: 52-83; Sayyid 2017: 73]. In this sense, the Islamic resistance movements against Turkey's secularist regime, much like those that opposed the shah in Iran, can be described as Islamist, even if neither of the two states was officially colonized. They share a common raison d'être with the explicitly Islamist movements of the Arab region: resistance to both global Western-centrism and its local proxies.

The new states that arose in the struggle against modern imperialism generally took on a postcolonial character, as manifested in so-called Third Worldism. What separates Islamism from other resistance movements and challengers of Western-centrism is its normative emphasis. Because of this raison d'être, even after Islamist groups secure political and economic sovereignty, struggles over identity, culture, and values continue to be waged domestically. Added to this is the fact that Western-centric Orientalism has essentialized Islam in particular as an "inferior other," one that serves as the mirror image of the West in the Western imagination [Said 1978].

[2] As mentioned below in Section III-1, although the suppression of democracy based on Kemalism came to be regarded as unjust in the first half of the AKP period, all public offices still display Atatürk's photograph in accordance with the law. In other words, while the AKP government has won the public's consent to break down the undemocratic aspects of military-backed Kemalism, it recognizes the breadth and depth of the civic Kemalism prevalent among the people and understands that eradicating it is not conducive to regime stability. In fact, as mentioned in note 4, a furor arose when AKP government officials openly ridiculed Atatürk, and the party had no choice but to officially disavow such sentiments.

For this reason, Orientalism harbors an inherent Islamophobia. This places Kemalism and similar ideologies, as a kind of internal Orientalism, in a uniquely problematic position in postcolonial nation-states, where Muslim identity is often placed at the center of nationalism to bring people together, but Islamophobia against the same people also inheres. Therefore, the epistemological target of Islamism, whether in the West or at home, is the hegemony and dominance of the inherent and inseparable unity of Western-centrism, Orientalism, and Islamophobia.

2. Occidentalism as a "Weapon of the Weak" and its Manifestation in Turkey

In a society where "Kemalists" hold power, Western-centrism defines the value of cultural and social capital. It manifests itself as class superiority in all aspects of life, from interpersonal behavior, such as manners, to tastes in food, leisure, and music [Ayata 2002; Göle 2015; Kardam 2015; İnsel 2017; Sawae 2017]. And, as is typical of Turkey, the privileged emulate idealized Westerners. They appreciate Western classical music and art, watch Western productions on television and in theaters, and enjoy drinking at the family table. Relationships between men and women in public spaces tend to be closer than the norm of the society in general, and mixed socialization continues even after adolescence. Although atheists are rare, many people are secular and do not think deeply about their faith. While social relations and values outside the privileged classes have changed rapidly in recent years as a result of urbanization and economic development, further back in time the distinction between the Western-centric elite and the masses was particularly marked, with the latter tending to value Islamic and traditional social norms.

For Turkish Islamists, as well as for many of the common people who revere Atatürk and reject political Islamic movements, the pervasive visibility of the West has long served as a symbol of a Western-centered cultural imperialism that subordinates their own culture. It is both an object of longing and a source of economic, social, and class inferiority, one whose moral rejection allows local people to maintain their self-respect and the dignity of their culture. That is the activation of Occidentalism.

Occidentalism is the reverse of Orientalism. It can take the form of economic or cultural nationalism paired with criticism or denigration of the "West" as a means

of reversing the power relationship in the East-West dichotomy. Or it can divide the national culture into two opposing cultures: one a local tradition belonging to the masses; the other a modern culture of the local elite, deriving from the West. Occidentalism criticizes the latter as a cultural dependence on the West and defends the former as a source for endogenous development [Hanafi 2008: 260; 265].

Just as Orientalism views "the West and the rest" in a civilizationally essentialist relationship of superiority and inferiority, Occidentalism positions the West as morally and spiritually inferior to its own society. As Buruma and Margalit put it in their book *Occidentalism*, the West, as understood in "its image of rootless and arrogant and greedy and decadent and frivolous cosmopolitanism" [Buruma and Margarit 2004: 11], is regarded as advancing imperialism not only militarily but also spiritually, through a soulless rationalism. They continue: "Occidentalism can be seen as the expression of bitter resentment toward an offensive display of superiority by the West" [Buruma and Margalit 2004: 95] and as an epistemological identity strategy that justifies its superiority over the West. Ironically, their book ignored the power relationships involved in the global hegemony of Western-centrism and its backing by Western political, economic, and military power [Bilgrami 2006: 389], ending with a chapter on Islam and Muslims that epitomized all that is problematic with Orientalism. This is truly a display of the privileges of the modern West.

Because Occidentalism is an epistemological weapon of the weak against a master who is indifferent to such power relations,[3] it appears only in the presence of Orientalism. Aydin, who specializes in the modern history of Asia, including the Ottoman Empire, points out that the origin of Occidentalism in modern Turkey dates to the late Ottoman period. One of the important points Aydin makes is that all the intellectuals of the late Ottoman period, including those representing contemporary Islamic trends, were modernists who were eager to show the essential compatibility between Islam and modernity [Aydin 2006: 448]. However, starting with the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and the Balkan War the following year, anti-Western attitudes came to dominate. As a result, two distinct currents of Turkish Occidentalism arose: the pro-Western Occidentalism of the Kemalists, and the anti-

[3] For the concept of "the weapons of the weak," see Scott [1985].

Western Occidentalism of the Islamists. The latter arose as a reaction against the former, Kemalist Westernism, and was not observed in the late Ottoman period [Aydin 2006: 451-453].

The National Outlook movement (Milli Görüş; hereafter, MG), which was a forerunner of Turkey's major Islamist parties, including the AKP, criticized Orientalism from the late 1960s, using an Occidentalist caricature of the West to inflame popular resentment against both its global and its local representatives.[4] Turkey's anti-Western Occidentalist discourse overlaps with that of populism, which has attracted attention in recent years, with the Kemalist elite positioned as a traitor that prioritizes its own interests and those of the West, the global hegemonic power, against the interests of the people as a whole. One of the defining characteristics of the MG's anti-establishment discourse, from the movement's inception until the early 2000s, was its tendency to define Kemalists and center-right political leaders as Freemasons, based on the Western-import conspiracy theory. These Freemasons, it charged, were in league with a secret Western organization that controlled the world from behind the scenes, and were using the reins of state to serve the interests of the secret organization and themselves, much to Turkey's own detriment [Sawae 2005: 73-74; 78-83; Sawae 2017: 187-188].

But in rejecting Western-centrism, Occidentalism does not necessarily propose something unmodern, an imagined return to an idealized past. Although the MG movement opposed the West, it argued that the domestic and foreign policies it advocated had both the material modernity of the West and the spirituality of Islam. Turkey's Islamist parties, at least, never advocated rejecting the technologies and political and economic institutions that had developed in the modern West, even as they fiercely criticized Westernism. Much of this is exemplified in the case of the MG movement's Welfare Party (1983-1997), which proposed a political and economic plan called the Just Order (Adil Düzen) that aimed to correct class and regional distributional injustices through state-led heavy industrialization policies,

[4] As a relatively recent case, in 2013, Erdoğan caused a stir when he mocked Atatürk and the second president, İnonü, as "two drunks" (*iki ayyaş*) at a regular assembly of party MPs. For an article about a press conference in which Çelik, who was the deputy leader of the AKP and the spokesperson for the party, was pressed to offer an explanation for the comment, see *Milliyet* [2013].

even as it used anti-Western rhetoric in its condemnation of Kemalism, Western-centric diplomacy, and domestic Orientalist value norms.

III. The Muddle of Post-Kemalist Islamism

1. The Collapse of Internal Orientalism

Until the end of the twentieth century, the majority of Turkey's population heeded the Kemalist elite's warnings that political Islam was a threat to the country. Prior to the AKP, the best electoral showing MG-affiliated parties ever secured was 25 percent of the vote, in 1995. In that election, the Welfare party managed to build a coalition and form a government, but by doing so it spurred the military to take action. The result was the so-called 28 February Campaign, a "soft" coup and subsequent crackdown on suspected Islamist sympathizers carried out with broad support from the judiciary, universities, the business community, and major media. The Welfare Party was outlawed, and women with headscarves were banned from universities and state institutions. Over the longer term, however, the coup also raised questions about the legitimacy of the Kemalist elite's intervention in democracy.

The Welfare Party's immediate successor was the Virtue Party, which also was swiftly closed down. This prompted the AKP, established as its next successor, to adopt a new strategy. It abandoned the anti-Western, anti-Kemalist Occidentalist discourse of its predecessors, embracing instead a pro-Western stance. Just before formally establishing the party, the party leaders made a round of visits to major Western countries to build trust.[5] This reversal of the MG movement's anti-Westernism allowed the party to build a large base of voters who favored moderate

[5] Turgut Özal's Motherland Party was the first in Turkey to adopt this approach. Özal ran (but failed) in 1977 under the National Salvation Party, which represented the MG movement. He was also a member of a tariqa, the movement's parent body. The Özal administration emphasized a combination of Turkish nationalism and Islam as a core element in its Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Doctrine. It also implemented an Islamic-leaning economic policy by opening the country to Islamic banking. Diplomatically, it embraced a turn to multi-dimensional diplomacy focusing on the Middle East and Muslim world. Because of his pro-Western stance, Özal is rarely classified as an Islamist. However, if we distinguish between anti-Westernism and criticism of Western-centrism, Özal, who promoted the relativization of Western-centrism through his policy of emphasizing Islamic identity even as he maintained a pro-Western stance, stands out a positive example of the form Islamism can take.

reform and propelled the party to victory in the 2002 election. During its first two terms, the AKP government achieved rapid economic growth, which led it to become a catch-all party that gained support from voters across the ideological spectrum. In the second term, police and judicial officials from the Gülenist movement, then allies of the AKP regime, led a large purge of former and current military officers, including the former chief of the Turkish General Staff, convicting them of plotting to overthrow the government.[6] Kemalism's reign was at an end, and Kemalists were decried as arrogant elites whose authoritarian interventions in democracy were illegitimate violations of the will and values of the people.[7] In 2009, a scholar of Turkish politics and society described the concomitant changes taking place in the academic world as follows:

> Both in theory and in practice the issue of secularism has become a major object of academic inquiry. … Secularism seems to be under attack in all parts of the world. … Simply put, the Turkish conception of secularism, *laiklik*, came to be regarded as *authoritarian*, *hostile to religion*, or *assertive*, aiming to eliminate the influence of religion on the public sphere in a coercive manner [Gürbey 2009: 371; emphasis in the original].

The transition to post-Kemalism means that internal Orientalism at the local level has disappeared in Turkey, leaving the hegemonic structure of global Orientalism the sole target of anti-Western critique. But this was only possible because of the Turkish Islamist movement's successful pro-Western strategy at the international level. Though Kemalism's domestic democratic legitimacy had been crumbling for some time, the final straw came when it lost its external support as

---

[6] This incident, exemplified by the "Ergenekon Trials," marked the beginning of the post-Kemalist era. Members of Turkey's once-revered Kemalist elite were sentenced to life imprisonment, the highest possible sentence in the country. Many of these sentences were subsequently overturned after the government's relationship with the Gülenists soured and evidence emerged of widespread judicial failings, including fabrication of evidence, illegal wiretapping, and procedural problems. For more on this, see a paper by Jenkins [2011], an expert on political and military relations in Turkey.

[7] At the beginning of the AKP's second term in office, a Kemalist doctor I spoke to complained that identifying openly as a Kemalist had become taboo. The situation is comparable to making a "politically incorrect" statement in the American liberal public sphere. This doctor's statement indicated a post-Kemalist shift in normative power relations.

well, when the West chose to cooperate with local pro-Western Islamists over the old Kemalist establishment. The West's willingness to do this marked an important shift in global Orientalism, a structural change in terms of its relationship with Islam, as the next section will examine.

2. Global Islamophilia and the Easing of the Post-Kemalist Shift

The support of the West, which enabled Islamism to triumph over Kemalism locally, was made possible by a combination of geopolitical demands and epistemological circumstances of the period. In terms of geopolitics, the rise of armed Islamic groups in Central Asia and North Africa after the end of the Cold War threatened the interests of Western countries in those regions, and Western states came to believe it was in their interest to have a pro-Western Islamic government leading Turkey and serving as a model for Muslims around the world. Meanwhile, epistemologically, a post-Cold War pessimism, embodied by Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, amplified Islamophobia, even as the post-modernist tide rising since the late 1970s ushered in a new atmosphere of tolerance, coexistence, and diversity, as a search for an alternative modernity became the focus of both academic and civic movements.

This search, coupled with Orientalist critique and related efforts to decenter the West at that time, created a new epistemic tide in the West. There arose a growing tendency in the liberal public sphere in the West to attend to the Islamist critique and to sympathize with attempts to envision a modern political society based on a civilization different from the West as a means of overcoming Western-centrism. This liberal current encouraged Islamophilia as a kind of welcome diversity, Islam as an "other" one could live with.

Islamophilia is ambivalent to the logic of Western-centric criticism. While it respects Muslims, it does not do so universally. Shryock, who has discussed Islamophilia and its correlation with Islamophobia as twin concepts, rejects both concepts as sharing the same essentialist view of Muslims [Shryock 2010: 9-10]. While Islamophobia considers enemy extremists as the essential state of Islam, Islamophilia considers Sufis and Muslims who glorify multireligious coexistence, democracy, and gender equality as the only true Muslims, rejecting the rest. Just as Occidentalism has the two contrasting attitudes toward the other (i.e., pro- and anti-

Westernism), Orientalism has nurtured both Islamophobia and Islamophilia.

In short, both divide Muslims into "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims" [Mamdani 2003]. "Good Muslims" are Muslims who are "Muslim friends who think and act in the same way as 'us'" [Shryock 2010: 11], and "bad Muslims" are Muslims who are inconvenient for "us." For Islamophobia, Muslims are essentially non-modern, anti-Western beings with whom coexistence is impossible, so there are essentially only "bad Muslims." At best, it is possible to have a relationship that maintains a superficial friendship so long as it can be used strategically to further one's interests, just as the United States supported the armed Islamic resistance when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and maintained friendly relations with the autocratic Gulf states concerning resource issues, the protection of Israel, and opposition to Iran. In what a cynic might read as an attempt to co-opt Muslims with this Islamophobic logic, after the trauma of 9/11, the Bush administration divided Muslims into "moderates" and "extremists and fundamentalists" and sought to win over and embrace the former as "good Muslims." This attitude remained essentially unchanged after the change of administration from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. As seen in the tacit American approval of the overthrow of the Morsi government in Egypt and the priority accorded to the eradication of armed Islamist movements such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, US politicians of both parties do not hesitate to divide Muslims into good and bad and to work to eliminate the latter.

As such, both conservatives and liberals are equally Western-centric and Orientalist. Whether Islamophile or Islamophobe, they attack the "bad Muslims" they view as a threat and accept only those they can embrace from a dominant position. In this sense, Western liberalism is at once superior to and even more troubling than Western conservatism, because it has a built-in dynamic that seeks to expand the scope and power of its own hegemony by "generously" incorporating others as inferiors in its own hegemonic structure.[8] While this is an engine for constant democratization as long as liberalism's own hegemony is maintained, it is

[8] Indeed, in a discussion of how social-science disciplines have treated Islamic political movements, Volpi notes that although it has become common in recent years to point out the diversity of political ideologies among Muslims, Western-centered liberal perception bias plays a role in reducing this diversity to the black-and-white categories of "liberal" and "radical" [Volpi 2010: 2; 16-17].

still a kind of Western-centrism marked by an unwillingness to coexist as a minority under the logic of others, just like conservatism.

In the first half of the AKP's rule, the West viewed both the party and its Gülenist allies as ideal "good Muslims" and welcomed the post-Kemalism they promoted as a form of democratization.[9] The Gülenist group is an Islamic group that does not fit neatly within the definition of Islamism this chapter draws upon. It grew from an Islamic study circle led by Fethullah Gülen into probably the most expansive social and economic network in Turkey, a network that extends far beyond the national borders. Though hostile to Western-centrism at the local level as an opponent of Turkey's Kemalist elite, it eschewed a postcolonial stance internationally, embracing instead a position that was pro-Western and pro-Israel. Gülen himself had been living in self-imposed exile in the United States since the time of the 28 February Campaign, and his movement attracted academic and media commentators both inside and outside Turkey. It held numerous conferences in Turkey and abroad on topics that drew favorable attention from the West, such as multicultural and multireligious coexistence, democratization, and the invigoration of civil society.[10] Gülenist hostility toward Iran and its embrace of a new discourse of multiethnic symbiosis on the Kurdish issue, too, were in line with what Western governments and public opinion wanted to hear. The description best representing this group would be an interest group that works to maximize its human resources and connections, business interests, and political influence, both domestic and international, by effectively deploying Muslim Turkish identity in the public sphere. In Turkey, the Gülen movement's official newspaper, *Zaman* (Time), became a popular and respected newspaper that even secular intellectuals subscribed to on a daily basis, and *Today's Zaman*, its English-language version, became an international presence.

---

[9] See Kubicek [2020] for a self-criticism of liberal Islamophilia.

[10] Gülen also drew attention because he was able to meet the Pope, even though he was merely a retired mosque preacher and religious-group leader in Turkey at the time, never in a higher position at the Directorate General of Religious Affairs, Turkey's official religious state organization (today's Presidency of Religious Affairs). The meeting took place in February 1998. The timing is interesting, given that the 28 February Campaign began exactly one year earlier. See Özkök [1998] for news reports that influential members of the Catholic Church in New York mediated in the final stages of preparation for the meeting.

Meanwhile, from the time of the Gulf War, Turkey's Kemalists had become increasingly anti-American, arguing that the US-led policy of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq encouraged the armed struggle of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a leftist Kurdish guerrilla group in Turkey. Some in the military, the most important Kemalist bastion, are reported to have begun to doubt the alliance with the United States and to instead consider a partnership with China and Russia.[11] Given this souring of relations, it is only natural that the West welcomed a pro-Western Islamist government.

In this process, local Orientalists (Kemalists) were divided into either liberal secularists moving toward Islamophilia or secular anti-Western Occidentalists,[12] with other Kemalists floating between the two poles. These ideological shifts within secular society were each codified in a new daily newspaper, respectively *Taraf* (Side, 2007-2016) and *Sözcü* (Spokesperson, 2007-present),[13] and the long-established *Cumhuriyet* (Republic, 1924-present), which had traditionally embodied the position of the Kemalist elite, sought to position itself between the two through several reshufflings of its editorial structure and columnist staff. Because *Taraf* used the printing house and the distribution network of the Gülenist group, some people viewed it as a liberal paper in which the Gülenists were involved. Given that the Gülenists had made great efforts to expand Islamophilia both at home and abroad, it is not surprising that similar efforts were made in the realm of media, one of the most important authorities in modern society. The newspaper was shut down after the 2016 coup attempt, and warrants were issued for its senior editors and reporters, who were accused as intermediaries for publishing material allegedly leaked by the Gülenist police and judiciary and for their "investigative" reporting in the Balyoz case [Tittensor 2018: 221], which was similar to the aforementioned "Ergenekon"

11 For the perspective of so-called Eurasianism, see Gurcan [2017].

12 In Turkey, the latter is an ideological position called "Ulusalcı."

13 Reflecting the liberal atmosphere cultivated under Özal's leadership, secular liberal dailies first began to establish a presence in the 1990s, including *Yeni Yüzyıl* (The new century, 1994-1999) and *Radikal* (Radical, 1996-2016). The two newspapers provided a forum to discuss the undemocratic nature of Kemalism, but both were closed due to financial difficulties. This trend was apparent, too, in the Islamist public sphere during this period, as exemplified by the journalist and columnist Ali Bulaç, who frequently emphasized the coexistence of diversity under the Prophet Muhammad. See Sawae [2002] on this point.

trial (see note 6).

In any case, Turkish Islamism, which used Islamophilia to help it achieve a post-Kemalist transition in its first decade in power, should have had no epistemic obstacles to achieving its objectives, at least domestically, in its second. Instead, however, it plunged into authoritarianism, as described above. How should we make sense of this?

3. By-Products of the "Banality of Governing" and the Fading of the Islamist Cause

The transition to post-Kemalism was a chance for Islamism to deliver on its promise of a more just public order and more ethical mode of governance. This, Sayyid points out in his preface to the second edition of *A Fundamental Fear* [2003], is where many Islamist movements falter, performing poorly against the challenges associated with the "banality of governing," such as collecting garbage and making sure the trains run on time [Sayyid 2015: xxix-xxx]. He cites the AKP as an important exception in this regard, a successful example of a popular Islamist movement rising to power and enacting social welfare policies that improve people's lives in concrete ways. He argues that other Islamist groups, which have largely been engaged in resistance movements with strong theological overtones, should develop similar political projects related to daily life and effective public administration.

Aktay, a scholar of Islamism and a senior official of the AKP, echoes that sentiment, saying that "democracy, human rights, good governance, justice and development, or 'bread, freedom and dignity'" [Aktay 2013: 116] are an essential political objective of Islamism. And, he says, if Islamism's traditionally confrontational public discourse ends up taking a back seat to such concerns, this is not because Islamists have abandoned Islamism, but rather because such discourse has achieved its purpose and there is no longer any need to shout [Aktay 2013: 119].[14]

The AKP's success in this regard, though perhaps exceptional among Islamist

[14] Aktay made this argument just before the Gezi Park protests and the outbreak of antagonism with the Gülenists, at a time when the AKP's early policy achievements and the concrete good they effected in the lives of the common people were still fresh in everyone's minds.

movements to date, should come as no surprise. While many of the institutions, policies, and practices associated with good governance may well have emerged out of Western-centric modernity, they are not themselves inherently Western. Islamism, and other anti-Westernist movements, have just as much a claim to them as anyone else. As Carol Gluck, who specializes in modern Japanese history, points out, modernity is not an option but an inevitable condition that affects everyone; and as we enter a globalizing, Western-centric modern era, societies are creating their own type of modernity. It is impossible to envision a modernity that is completely cut off from the modern ideas and institutions that first emerged in Western society, and that is why Gluck characterizes modernity as a co-production inescapable under the "tyranny of modern times" [Gluck 2011: 676-677]. Any attempt to reject this imperative of the age would be to try to return to the non-modern or pre-modern,[15] something that is no longer possible in postcolonial circumstances. After all, the "post" in "postcolonial" indicates an attempt to look at both the legacy and the still-active mechanism of colonialism and to rectify the problems stemming from them, not to turn back the clock to a time before the colonial experience occurred.[16]

In Turkey, which borders on the West and has crafted its state and nation through a Western mirror since the Ottoman period, many Islamist leaders, both pro- and anti-Western, have emerged from decidedly Western institutions. The leader of

---

[15] Although certain Islamist movements do claim to promote non-modern or pre-modern forms of Islam, academics and others who take such claims at face value and condemn those who advance them as fundamentalists are often simply labeling them "bad Muslims" without any regard for the rationale and purpose such claims have for the groups making them. Euben, a researcher of Islamic political movements mainly in the Arab region, criticizes such condemnations as an "exercise of power" that ignores "the adherers' own understanding of the connection between action and meaning" [Euben 1999: 43].

[16] Santos, who studies postcolonial "epistemology from the South," summarizes this as follows:

> [T]he anti-imperial South, the South of epistemologies of the South, is not the reversed image of the North of the epistemologies of the North. The epistemologies of the South do not aim to replace the epistemologies of the North and put the South in the place of the North. The aim is to overcome the hierarchical dichotomy between North and South. The South opposing the North is not the South constituted by the North as victim, but rather the South that rebels in order to overcome existing normative dualism. The issue is not to erase the differences between North and South, but rather to erase the power hierarchies inhabiting them [Santos 2018: 7] .

In other words, after decentering the West, the postcolonial challenger does not seek to gain Western imperial status and power and dominate the world, but rather to dissolve the imperialist/colonialist structures that undergird those forms of status, power, and dominance.

the MG movement, Necmettin Erbakan, studied engineering at university and was a professor with a PhD earned in Germany. The broader MG movement had many graduates from secular faculties who worked for the development of Turkey in the National Planning Agency [Gürdoğan 1991]. All of Erdoğan's own children have studied in Europe or the United States. Immigrant societies in Europe and the United States will be one of the important centers of Islam in the future. Moreover, Turkish society as a whole, including the AKP and the Gülenists, continues to be exposed to epistemological Western-centrism, not only through the state policies of Kemalism, but also through various aspects of everyday life: consumerist culture, associated entertainment culture, education, and the media. That is why, as Aydin pointed out, Turkish Islamism has at least since the end of the Ottoman period been consistently modernist, even as it has divided into various positions in terms of whether it is pro- or anti-Western or which part of the West it criticizes.

In light of these points and the politics of the AKP administration, it can be concluded that, at least in the case of Turkey today, the political economy and society envisioned by Islamists are not so different from those of the modern West. Their modernity is a fusion of Western and homegrown cultural traditions and values, a fusion whose realization promises to dignify and honor the Islamic self that has been so long denied by internal and external Orientalism. The AKP government achieved almost all of this in its first decade of rule, thereby garnering wide popular support. But by doing so, the AKP may well have lost its will to remain an epistemological challenger.

The problem seems to be that the regime's Islamic identity had always been closely bound to its Islamist challenge to the Kemalist establishment; but once the AKP rose to a position of epistemological power and defeated its Kemalist opponents, it no longer had the challenge of Kemalism to push back against, and that aspect of its identity foundered. The Istanbul Gezi Park protests in the early summer of 2013 were probably the first time this became clear. The protests, which began as an effort to protect a park in Istanbul from urban development, quickly spread across the country and ended with a violent crackdown by the government. The meanings the demonstrations held for those who participated (or refrained from participating) were as varied as the people themselves. The Gezi protests were truly a microcosm

of the issues facing Turkish politics and society.[17]

For example, many Kurds held back from joining the protests. As mentioned above, during its early years in government, the AKP embraced coexistence and diversity, albeit under a Sunni-Turkish predominance. Beginning in 2005, Erdoğan himself admitted that the Kurds had been treated unfairly throughout the history of the republic and vowed to rectify the situation. In his second term in office, from 2007, the government held a number of meetings to seek solutions to problems endemic to Turkish politics and society, bringing together representatives of ethnic-minority organizations, including journalists and parliamentarians of minority background, to work with the AKP to identify and address the issues they faced.[18] Turkey also carried out temporary summit-level diplomacy aimed at restoring diplomatic relations with Armenia. And it was far more inclusive than the secular Turkish nationalism of Kemalism. By the time the Gezi Park protests began, the peace process with PKK had entered its final phase, and the guerrillas had begun their partial and gradual withdrawal from the country. This conciliatory atmosphere helped to limit the spread of demonstrations in Kurdish-majority areas.

On the other hand, Alevis, a Muslim minority that makes up 10-20 percent of Turkey's population,[19] joined in the protests in striking numbers and accounted for all the civilian deaths during the protests. According to an interview I conducted with a professor at Turkey's prestigious Boğaziçi University who is herself an Alevi,[20] around the time of the Gezi protests, a senior state official acknowledged privately to her that while they had made considerable progress on the Kurdish issue, the Alevi

[17] For more on the protests, see Yavuz [2021: 172-190].

[18] For a paper in English written by a sociologist who was substantially involved in planning and managing meetings concerning the problems faced by Turkey's Alevis, a minority in Islam, see Subaşı [2010].

[19] Exact numbers are hard to come by. Turkey has a religion section in its population registry, but the state does not release that information as an official statistic. According to a nationwide 2018 report by a private polling company, 5 percent of respondents identified as "Alevi," 4 percent as "other Muslim," and 4 percent of men and 2 percent of women answered "no faith." But it is possible that minorities may not have felt comfortable sharing their identity with unknown investigators, and some left-wing Alevis see Alevism as a philosophical and cultural group rather than a religion. Approximately 85 percent of the respondents in the poll identified themselves as "Sunnis," Turkey's majority faith, while less than 1 percent identified as members of non-Islamic faiths. Based on these numbers, and assuming Alevis constitute the overwhelming majority of Turkey's non-Sunni population, they would account for about 15 percent Turkey's population. For a summary of the report, see Yetkin [2019].

[20] Personal interview by the author on 11 January 2014.

issue remained to be addressed; he reportedly further stated that at the time, he expected the Alevi issue to be the next focus within the government.

It was widely reported that many children of AKP leaders and activists also participated in the demonstrations, and many more likely would have but were stopped by their families.[21] In joining the demonstrations, or sympathizing from a distance, this younger generation of AKP activists likely sought to confront the AKP for its growing corruption, which contradicts the premise of Islamist politics and may ultimately cost the party its significance as an Islamist movement. Indeed, much like the collusion that occurred between the government and development-related businesses in Japan during the rapid growth of the postwar period, corruption was pervasive in the government, political parties, and business community in Turkey, where privatization and large-scale land development were the driving forces of rapid economic growth. When the AKP first came to power, it gained recognition both locally and nationally for its administrative capability and social-welfare policies, including support for low-income earners, which relied on grassroots efforts to meet the needs of ordinary people [White 2011]. In addition, under the slogan of the "Fight against the Three *Y*s"—namely, the eradication of injustice (*yolsuzluk*), poverty (*yoksulluk*), and prohibitions (*yasaklar*)—the AKP was lauded for its achievements in the eradication of corruption, which was abundant in the daily lives of ordinary people: for example, traffic police demanding "soup money" instead of fines for breaking the rules. However, as we shall see in the next section, the extent of corruption among senior members of the government and their families, including Erdoğan's son, reached startling heights, as made clear in December 2013 when tapes were released attesting to massive graft within the party.

In an interview I conducted before the Gezi demonstrations and the release of the tapes, a leader of an AKP-affiliated organization told me that while the Kemalists had been forced to look inward and engage in a process of critical self-examination in the post-Kemalism era, the AKP had not; its problems were far less grave.[22] In

[21] A former member of the MG movement and AKP supporter with whom I have been a close friend since 1999 told me that he himself had to stop his university-age children from participating in the demonstrations.

[22] Personal interview by the author on 13 March 2013.

other words, AKP concerns about the alienation of the party's younger members, both from the party and from Islam (as described in note 1, above), had not yet emerged onto the scene. That would come later, as a reaction against AKP corruption.

At the time of its inception, the AKP claimed to have "taken off the MG's shirt" in order to soften the MG movement's anti-Western Occidentalist image, and it listed "conservative democracy," rather than something more explicitly Islamist, as its ideological position in its party platform [Akdoğan 2003]. In other words, it declared that Islam should be treated as a part of the traditional culture of the people, not as a political program. In addition, attracted by the party's inclusivity, as detailed above, an increasing number of people with ideological positions that had nothing to do with the MG or other Islamic movements were joining the ranks of the party's leaders, cabinet members, and supporters. Furthermore, as stable ruling parties became the norm, many Islamists shifted their attention to other concerns, like better living standards and personal prestige. In an interview I conducted with one such party member—a longtime friend and former senior member of the MG movement who applied for the AKP's candidate list for the 2011 general election—I asked what he wanted to achieve when he became an MP. He looked down and said, under his breath, "I'm no longer working for the cause [*dava*]." With a landslide victory expected for the AKP in the 2011 elections, many people applied to the party as candidates in hopes of promoting their own various agendas. The same held true in subsequent elections as well—for example, Savcı Sayan, a politician who came up through the ranks of the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Kemalist political party as old as the republic itself, switched to the AKP in the June 2015 election. The AKP was seen as a winning horse, not an Islamist party.

Hoffer, who wrote a book on mass movements in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, distinguished between "mass movements," which attract people seeking to lose themselves in the movement, and "practical organizations," which appeal to people desiring to promote themselves and their own self-interest [Hoffer 2002 (1951): 14]:

> When a mass movement begins to attract people who are interested in their individual careers, it is a sign that it has passed its vigorous stage; that it is no

> longer engaging in molding a new world but in possessing and preserving the present. It ceases then to be a movement and becomes an enterprise [Hoffer 2002 (1951): 16].

These two candidate episodes suggest that the AKP had already made the transition from "movement" to "enterprise" in its second term (2007-2011) and completed it entering in its third term (2011-2015).[23]

4. The Betrayal of Islam by Islamists

Meanwhile, the AKP's Islamist roots have given it a certain credibility in post-Kemalist Turkey that the party has used to great effect. It was untainted by the stain of the Kemalist past. The party could claim that it was not a part of the center-right establishment that had colluded with the Kemalist state for so long, but instead Islamist, and had fought against it. The AKP used these roots to justify its populism and present itself as a representative of the repressed "true national identity." For the same reason, it was effective in attracting the support of Islamic voters in general, including former supporters of the MG movement, and religious Kurds who felt alienated by the leftist Kurdish nationalist movement. Moreover, fresh off its success against local Western-centrism, the party began to turn its sights on becoming a challenger to global Western-centrism, just as it hoped to expand its visibility as a regional power and join the ranks of developed countries in the medium to long term.

At the time of the Gezi Park protests, the memories and benefits of Turkey's rapid economic growth were still fresh, and corruption among AKP politicians and entrepreneurs was thought to have little potential to cause electoral defeat. In fact, other senior members of the government and columnists in the party-affiliated media expressed the view that if the AKP listened to protesters' grievances and offered some form of redress, it would not undermine the stability of the government. Yet Erdoğan instead ordered a violent crackdown.[24]

---

[23] This is all the more apparent in the latter half of the AKP administration, when the grassroots mobilization that has been a trademark of MG-affiliated political parties has faded [Sawae 2020: 263-264].

[24] It has been suggested that Erdoğan reacted out of a sense of paranoia that the protests were a veiled ploy to force him to step down. Given the fact that the Arab Spring was sweeping neighboring countries

I suspect that the Gezi Park protests, which included criticism not only from opposition parties but also from within the party's own Islamic base, reinforced Erdoğan's fear of losing political power. While other party leaders were willing to tolerate the demonstrations and to work toward a peaceful resolution, Erdoğan became more committed to fomenting political and social rifts over religion in Turkey. In doing so, the conflict between Kemalism and Islamism became a convenient tool for Erdoğan. Although the struggle for political power had been settled with the defeat of Kemalism in the post-Kemalist era, it remained vivid in the memories of the parties involved, and discourse in the mass media, social media, and even daily life contained myriad reminders that helped keep the memory of Kemalist oppression alive [Sawae 2017: 195-199].

For example, Erdoğan repeatedly claimed that Kemalists and leftists broke into mosques with their shoes on and drank alcohol; that a young woman wearing a headscarf was accosted by a group of male protesters while walking with her baby on the street; and that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (a member of Syria's Alawite Muslim minority) was responsible for car-bomb attacks that killed more than fifty people in a town near the Syrian border. Erdoğan described the last incident as "killing our Sunni Muslims." Regardless of whether these claims were true, they were effective in harnessing past trauma to bolster the support of Islamic public opinion[25]—so effective that Erdoğan has continued to use such rhetoric to shore up support and win elections even as he and his party have faced wave after wave of new challenges in the wake of the Gezi Park protests, including the conflict with the Gülenists, which I will discuss below, and an ongoing bribery scandal that has shaken the regime.[26]

---

at the time, the Morsi government in Egypt was being toppled, and pro-Morsi demonstrators massacred, all with the quiet acquiescence of the West, Erdoğan's fears may not have been unreasonable. But his penchant for stoking rather than mollifying the sociopolitical divide, as described in the following paragraphs, suggests that he had little respect for the democratic will. Indeed, he refused to accept the results of the June 2015 general elections, in which the AKP failed to win the parliamentary seats necessary for a stable single-party government, and instead forced a second round of elections, whose results gave him the parliamentary majority he wanted.

[25] Syria's Alawites and Turkey's Alevis are separate religious groups (despite the proximity of their names). But in Turkey, a country with a long and unresolved history of massacres of Alevis by Sunni Turkish nationalists, the use of such expressions by a political leader of Islamist origin, who is not infrequently a Turkish nationalist, risked scapegoating Alevis, who had nothing to do with the attacks.

[26] The first election after the Gezi protests was the March 2014 local elections. During the campaign,

If the banal governance of the post-Kemalist era is to be maintained as Islamism, such harsh rhetoric must be abandoned and a mechanism put in place to guard against politicians' natural thirst for power. However, Erdoğan opted instead to give free rein to his desire for power rather than to curtail it, and so too did the Gülenists, who accumulated power as a major ally of the Erdoğan regime until that period. As friction grew between the AKP and the Gülenists, Erdoğan decided to break away from and purge them. The Gülenists responded by leaking incriminating information about Erdoğan and the AKP (obtained through illegal means such as wiretapping, which they had been doing for some time, as mentioned above) to their affiliated media outlets.

Islamists used to invoke statements about the impartiality of justice in Islam: "The finger cut by sharia feels no pain"; "If someone steals, even if it is your father or son, you will hold him accountable"; "Stand out firmly for justice …. even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin" [Quran 4:135]. They criticized the corruption of secular forces and insisted that such acts would be punished properly if they were in power. But as the case of the AKP shows, that is not what happened.

Erdoğan effectively obstructed the investigation of AKP members and relatives implicated in corruption by dismissing those in charge of the prosecution and the police, and by a mass reshuffling of those involved in the investigation. In addition, most of the members of the ruling party, which had a majority of seats in the parliament, voted against submitting the case to the Constitutional Court for an impeachment trial, making it impossible to pursue it further.[27] Within the administration, then-prime minister Davutoğlu tried to push for legislation related to political ethics, but Erdoğan (then president) publicly opposed the idea and did not allow it to proceed. During this period, when I asked AKP supporters whether corrupt party officials should not be held accountable, they generally answered, "Now is not the time, but no matter how far ahead, they will definitely be held to

I interviewed people from AKP-affiliated civic organizations and several Turkish nationalists who felt an affinity for Islamism against the internal Orientalism of Kemalism. At that time, the AKP's core supporters were still highly skeptical about claims of Erdoğan's corruption, though many said they believed in corruption outside of Erdoğan and his family.

[27] It should be noted, however, that several dozen members of the ruling party are believed to have rebelled. For details on the vote and the estimated number of rebels, see *Milliyet* [2015].

account." In other words, most people believed there was corruption, but they were reluctant to accept a trial that could lead to the AKP's fall from power, and therefore chose to remain silent.

Amid this scandal, the conflict between the Erdoğan government and the Gülenists rapidly developed into the total suppression of the latter by the former [Yavuz 2021: 260-299]; then, after the failed coup d'état in July 2016 [Yavuz and Balci 2018], this suppression grew into a reign of terror in which any political actor, journalist, or ordinary citizen who criticized Erdoğan could be subject to repression. In the process, the country's economy and currency went into free fall, and in order to prevent the defection of the party's supporters and to strengthen its organized mobilization network, the administration began sliding further into nepotism, crony capitalism [Kimya 2019], and kleptocracy [Yavuz 2021: 108-112; 323-324], giving preferential treatment to its supporters and particular religious organizations in personnel affairs and public-works bidding.[28]

It is not only corruption in "banal governing" that has forced people to ask what ethics means in Islam, or what Islamic ethics means in Islamist politics. As mentioned above, it seems that for a long time, the Gülenists routinely wiretapped and sometimes secretly videotaped the workplaces and homes of politicians and state officials, and they cleverly used the media and abused the power of the police and the judiciary to purge their opponents. In addition, they are known to have worked for a long time to secure jobs and important positions for their own faction members at important state institutions. Erdoğan, too, has used social media and other platforms to attack his political opponents' personalities, and has filed a series of defamation charges against his critics, and even had some of them arrested. Especially after the attempted coup, informing on colleagues and acquaintances for

[28] In the past few years, complaints about *kayırmacılık*, or nepotism, have become frequent. Erdoğan's persistent promotion of his son-in-law to ministerial posts has been heavily and widely criticized even by his supporters. Such complaints are often coupled with a call for an emphasis on *liyakat*, or individual ability, achievement, and merit. In other words, the criticism is that personnel should be appointed for their ability and performance, not their personal connections. These concerns are often voiced by AKP supporters in meetings with AKP officials and bureaucrats. However, just as often, those same meetings then turn to pleas for that official's aid in securing a job or promotion for a friend or relative. Such discrepancies between people's ethical ideals and the reality of daily life are not peculiar to Islamism or its conservative base, and they cannot be attributed solely to the AKP regime, but they are all the more striking for the salience of Islamism's emphasis on moral rectitude.

selfish reasons became common—as a way of expressing loyalty to the regime, to ensure one's own security, and to dispel rivals in the race for advancement [Sawae 2020: 262-263].

This recent political and social turmoil has also caused a setback in the efforts to tackle religious, sectarian, and ethnic issues that boosted the AKP's reputation in the first half and middle of its rule. None of the issues on which it made early progress was ever fully resolved, least of all the Kurdish peace process. Instead, criticism and demands from minorities were suppressed along with the shift to authoritarianism.

In short, efforts to deal with problems beyond banal governance, problems relating to the shape of the state, have regressed significantly over the past decade. In addition, the AKP's achievements in the fields of administration and governance, areas in which it was once particularly effective, are now tainted because of widespread corruption and economic deterioration.[29]

5. Islamist Dependency on Orientalism

As in the first half of the AKP's rule, recent years have seen both Erdoğan and the Gülenists pursue survival and expansion strategies that rely primarily on Orientalism. In the first half, they utilized Islamophilia to eliminate Kemalism; but in the second half, they have exploited their respective positions in Orientalism for power struggles within their own camp. By provoking global and local Islamophobia against himself as a "bad Muslim," Erdoğan has orchestrated an Occidentalist

[29] One important exception is the AKP's enhancements to the social-security system, a system that is especially important in times of economic deterioration. Although criticism of Erdoğan by secularist feminists tends to distract the attention of the Western-centric public sphere, the Erdoğan administration's commitment to assisting women in the middle and lower classes seems to be one of the reasons why support for Erdoğan has not decreased below a certain level. For example, when a family member or relative takes care of a disabled or elderly person at home, the state now provides them a salary equivalent to the minimum wage. Women who are raising children have also been granted the right to choose flexible working arrangements while maintaining regular employment [Akkan 2018]. This means economic support for middle- and lower-class families that cannot afford private help, and especially for women who provide unpaid domestic work. It is often pointed out that the AKP enjoys a high level of support among low-income—and, therefore, generally less-educated—women, which fact is often ridiculed and attributed to the religiously blind faith of the conservative class. However, much of the support for Erdoğan from these segments of society can be attributed to the financial relief he has offered low-income and conservative women throughout his administration, as well as the respect this relief bespeaks for their dignity as a cultural class.

backlash among Muslims at home and abroad to rally support. Erdoğan's reputation in the eyes of Western governments and civil society has been severely tarnished by the crackdown on the Gezi Park protests, and since then, thanks to what might be termed the "Erdoğan-phobia" of the obsessive Western media, he has been able to effortlessly stir up vitriolic attacks against himself from Orientalists at home and abroad [Sawae 2017: 201], all of which serves to solidify his domestic support and, thus far, to win elections.

A symbolic example was seen during the campaign for the April 2017 presidential referendum. In the Turkish immigrant community in Europe, various political and social groups such as Islamists, Turkish nationalists, and Kurdish nationalists regularly carry out mobilization activities, and some of these groups function as European mobilization organizations for political parties in Turkey. Turkey institutionalized the right to vote for citizens living abroad in the mid-1990s, and Islamist parties in particular have focused on currying the immigrant vote by organizing return tours during elections. At the time of the 2017 referendum, which was expected to be highly divisive, the ruling party sent ministers out on the campaign trail to appeal to nearly three million immigrant voters. Germany and the Netherlands, however, banned their election rallies, citing concerns for public safety. Turkey's populist discourse risked inflaming not only conflict within Turkish immigrant communities living in Europe, but also broader social unrest in a Europe already fearful over the influx of Syrian immigrants and their relationship with ISIL, raising concerns about the possibility of violent confrontation between host communities and local AKP supporters. Since similar campaign rallies had been held in previous elections, the banning of party members from holding them that year caused strong objections from AKP supporters in Turkey and among Europe's Turkish immigrant community.

The situation escalated further when a female minister wearing a headscarf was prevented from entering the Netherlands due to the cancellation of her plane's landing permit; instead, she made her way into the Netherlands by land from Germany and tried to stop at the Turkish consulate in Rotterdam, where a rally was planned. AKP supporters lined up around her car in support, but the Dutch side mobilized the police to prevent the minister from entering the consulate. This greatly

upset the AKP supporters, who cried foul and moved to protest the police action, only to be dispersed by water cannons, while the minister was declared persona non grata and escorted to the German border and expelled by Dutch police. Erdoğan denounced the Netherlands as a "Nazi remnant," provoking further condemnation from the European side.[30]

In Turkey, prominent journalists critical of Erdoğan's government suggested that the reason the two countries had so strongly fanned the flames of their mutual ire was because the Netherlands had its own a general election coming up a few days after the episode at the consulate, and the ruling parties of the two countries believed that insulting each other as much as possible would help them win their respective elections.[31] On that reading, the Dutch government tried to incite Islamophobia and Erdoğan-phobia, and the Turkish government tried to incite a backlash of Occidentalism among its own people against that Islamophobia in order to highlight the government's resolve and increase its public support. In the event, the ruling parties of both countries won their elections.

Meanwhile, though the Gülenists have been incapacitated both in Turkey and in many Asian and African countries that were pressured by Turkey to take action against them, they are still playing themselves up in Westerners' eyes as "good Muslims" who are struggling against the "bad Muslims" of the AKP, and their efforts are successfully attracting the sympathy of Islamophiles for their cause.[32]

Hendrick, who has been studying the Gülenists while remaining cautious of their efforts to co-opt him, suggests that the reason for the Gülenists' success lies in their "very keen awareness of the public sphere's demand for 'good Islam'" in the Western-centric West [Hendrick 2018: 293]. He summarizes his experiences at a Gülenist conference he attended in 2005 as follows [Hendrick 2018: 298-299]: The presenters, mostly male journalists and researchers invited from Turkey or Turkish nationals studying in the United States, praised the Gülenists for their commitment to world peace and for nurturing a more compassionate next generation through

[30] See *BBC Türkçe* [2017] for a newspaper article on this story.
[31] For example, see Koru [2017].
[32] See, for example, chapter 5 by Kokaki in this volume, which mentions that in Ethiopia a Gülenist school is under the protection of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

interfaith dialogue and education. The audience included not only Gülenists but also many journalists invited from Turkey, as well as a number of officials from the country of Georgia. All the presenters were paid an honorarium, in addition to travel expenses, and the top three graduate-student presenters were awarded prizes. Hendrick criticizes many Islamophilic commentators in the global and local Western-centrist public sphere for serving as propagandists by proxy for the Gülenists based on information the Gülenists themselves produce or solicit, and for failing to ask how their work leads to "material accumulation, expansion of influence, and, in a word, power" [Hendrick 2018: 298-302].

Those Western journalists, government officials, and researchers who do not understand Turkish appear to be reached by English-fluent Gülenist "missionary" counterparts in the West who seek to convert them to what might be termed a "Gülenist-philia." Theirs is a mutually beneficial relationship that plays out in both economic and non-economic spheres: Western people gain access to information and connections useful for their careers, as well as credit for being "good Westerners," an honored status in the global normative hierarchy under the liberal hegemony, where an accommodationist attitude towards cultural and racial others is paramount; meanwhile, the Gülenists gain assets in the form of connections and trust for the Gülenist movement that help it to further expand its activities in the Western-centric West. This same Western-centric dynamic actively discourages people in the global power center of the Western-centric world from trying to find out why and how the Gülenists continue to be the target of criticism and suspicion in Turkey even at a time when Erdoğan's authoritarianism is facing growing opposition from his own supporters.[33]

This underscores the difficulty of continuing the postcolonial challenge after one has seized power and the ease and convenience of accommodating Western-centrism. After they rose to power, the Islamist AKP and the Gülenists both pursued an aim that contradicted their own raison d'être as a postcolonial challenger: the secular and banal desire to maintain and expand power while exploiting Western-centrism. As long as Western-centrism is maintained globally, the position of

[33] For a discussion on the gap between this aspect of the Gülenists and their image in the Western-centric public sphere, see Tittensor [2018].

Islamism can be secured in relation to it as a shortcut to rally support and maintain power. While for the Gülenists this takes the form of a concerted campaign to encourage Islamophilia for their own movement, for the AKP, it manifests as populism at home and a diplomacy centered on Islamophobia abroad. The more Western-centrism at home and abroad meets expectations in its embrace of Islamophilia and Islamophobia, the better for both Erdoğan and the Gülenists.

Conclusion: The Condition of Islamism under Post-Kemalism

> If Islam is constituted by orientalism, what happens when orientalism dissolves? What, if any, kind of Islam will remain? [Sayyid 1997: 35]

Regardless of the distortions inherent in Orientalism's representation of "the East," whether "the East" exists as ontologically distinct from "the West" is an open question. Edward Said's *Orientalism* drew some serious criticism on this point. If we accept that "the East" is merely the construction of Orientalism, as Said puts it, we can no longer discuss the "East" and "West" as opposites: both cease to exist. Sayyid summed up this conundrum in the quote above, substituting "Islam" for "the East." If we instead substitute "Islamism," where does the question lead?

According to Aktay, a senior AKP official, as discussed in Section III-3, the answer is that Islamism will achieve its goal and move into a period of "banal governing." But does this mean that political actors' Islamist roots will cease to matter? Will they become no different from secular politicians, pursuing a politics of mere self-interest, devoid of political ethics, and therefore no longer meriting the label "Islamist?"

The example of Erdoğan's AKP and the Gülenists suggests not. Former prime minister Davutoğlu and former minister of economic affairs Babacan each defected from the AKP and formed new parties as alternatives to Erdoğan's administration, targeting voters who feel that the AKP has strayed from Islamic ethics. Another party, the center-right Good Party, has embraced a similar approach, describing itself as

"the path of Umar," invoking the name of the second caliph, who was known for his strong sense of ethics.[34]

What this shows is that Western-centrism is not the only opponent of Islamism. Rather, as the global balance continues to shift, different forms Islamism will have to compete with one another to win hearts and minds. And when yesterday's Islamist challenger becomes today's Islamist government, it will be judged according to the Islamic values that it espoused during its rise. And should it fail to uphold that standard, then people will declare it a failure, even if it succeeds in challenging Western-centrism.

To avoid this judgment, Erdoğan frequently deploys Islamic symbols in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. Domestically, he has continued to expand the populist Islamist discourse of anti-Kemalism, and to build mosques and expand Islamic education. And internationally, he seeks to secure his Islamist credentials by making the task of calling out Islamophobia one of the main pillars of his foreign policy [Adar and Yenigün 2019].[35]

As Vakil explains, this act of calling out, or "naming," Islamophobia is an effective means for Muslims to break away from a subjugated position defined by Western-centric Orientalism and to advance a subject position of their own crafting:

> [W]hat is most significant is not *what* it [i.e., Islamophobia] names, … but rather *that* it names; and in naming, the namer it bespeaks rather than the named. Quite the opposite of victimhood, then, Islamophobia is about contestation and the power to set the political vocabulary and legal ground of recognition and redress. It is about the contemporary subjectification of Muslim political subject(ivitie)s [Vakil 2010: 23-24; emphasis in the original].

---

[34] The president of the polling company that undertook the public relations activities of the Good Party explained in an interview that over the past two years, the number of respondents who rank justice (*adalet*) as the most pressing issue facing the country has increased substantially, placing second, only after economic issues, in the latest survey. The decision to use Umar's name came from a series of focus-group interviews in which the overwhelming majority of participants thought of Umar when they heard the word "fair." See Samar [2021] for the interview.

[35] Adar and Yenigün [2019] point out that since the early 2010s, the Erdoğan administration has mobilized citizens and migrants from Turkey living abroad to orchestrate pro-Turkey lobbying by the diaspora and to reach out to Muslims in general around the world, behaving as a Muslim power whose main foreign policy pillar is the fight against Islamophobia.

But when the group calling out Islamophobia abroad is challenged on the basis of its ethics at home, what then? Yavuz, an expert on Turkish Islamic politics, has written off the Erdoğan regime's heavy use of Islamic symbols in domestic politics as nothing more than a "fig leaf to cover shamefully corrupt policies and a theology of persecution against … domestic and external enemies" [Yavuz 2020: 153]. Under such circumstances, "naming Islamophobia," even as one's diplomatic centerpiece, appears hollow, no matter how legitimate an act in the battle against global Orientalism.

But so long as the struggles against global Western-centrism and Islamophobia continue, Erdoğan's administration may well be able to use this strategy to maintain its Islamist identity through its foreign policy. Given the ongoing legacy of 9/11, the more recent suicide attacks by ISIL, the influx of Syrian refugees to Europe, and the gradual decline of the West in general, it seems likely that Islamophobia in the West will only increase, meaning that these struggles will not be resolved any time soon.

In other words, there will be plenty of opportunities to "name Islamophobia," even if it is partly to gloss over one's own greed for power and possessions; and regardless of the motives behind it, calling out Islamophobia is a legitimate act in itself, considering the discrimination and violence Islamophobia causes globally. Yet because this act of "naming" often takes the form of a clash between Western Islamophobia and anti-Western Occidentalism, it creates an opportunity for Islamic interest groups like the Gülenists, who skillfully enchant Western-centric Islamophiles to extract the maximum profit from the global atmosphere of Islamophobia. As it stands, both the Erdoğan government and the Gülenists continue to depend on Western-centrism for their existential legitimacy in their domestic power struggle.

The Gülenists, forced to move their power base to the West, will likely transform themselves further to meet the shifting expectations of Western-centric Islamophilia. As for the Erdoğan regime, will its current strategy of opposition to global Western-centric hegemony be enough for it to maintain Turkish Islamism's identity? It appears that the gap between the regime and the masses will only continue to widen, as the former prioritizes a naked struggle for power and the latter demands banal but good governance. This gap could be overcome by creating a

regime that is accountable to the will of the people, which would enable governance without suppression. Or the tensions it breeds could be squelched by the strong hand of authoritarianism. Islamism is not destined for authoritarianism, but that seems to be the path Erdoğan has chosen.

When Islamism's ostensible mission has been accomplished and domestic Western-centrism or Kemalism has been toppled from its pinnacle in a Muslim-majority society, Islamist governments need to abandon the domestic use of strategic Occidentalism and instead put forward a sustainable political platform and project for governance that will allow them to stand on their own merits. Islamists in Turkey may be further down this road than their peers in other countries in terms of their experience participating in the democratic process, but to succeed, they must find a way to bind their own failings through democratic politics and recommit to the just and fair treatment of minorities, both religious and ethnic, as part of their mission. At this point, however, they seem to have abandoned both causes. And while remarkably successful in their struggle against Western-centrism, they have so far failed in their struggle to uphold the Islamic values they ostensibly champion. From the perspective of the postcolonial challenge, the focus in the years to come will be on whether or not they find a way to turn these failures around.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 18H03619) and the Murata Science Foundation Overseas Research Fund (No. M21Overseas002).

References

Adar, Sinem and Halil Ibrahim Yenigün. 2019. "A Muslim Counter-Hegemony? Turkey's Soft Power Strategies and Islamophobia." *Jadaliyya*, 6 May. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/38646/A-Muslim-Counter-Hegemony-Turkey%E2%80%99s-Soft-Power-Strategies-and-Islamophobia (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Akdoğan, Yalçın. 2003. *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* [Conservative democracy]. Ankara: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi.

Akkan, Başak. 2018. “The Politics of Care in Turkey: Sacred Familialism in a Changing Political Context.” *Social Politics* 25(1): 72-91.

Aktay, Yasin. 2013. “The ‘Ends’ of Islamism: Rethinking the Meaning of Islam and the Political.” *Insight Turkey* 15(1): 111-125.

Ayata, Sencer. 2002. “The New Middle Class and the Joys of Suburbia.” In *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*. ed. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, 25-42. London: I. B. Tauris.

Aydin, Cemil. 2006. “Between Occidentalism and the Global Left: Islamist Critiques of the West in Turkey.” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26(3): 446-461.

BBC Türkçe. 2017. “Hollanda ile Ziyaret Krizi: Avrupa’da Miting Yapmak Neden Önemli? [The state-visit crisis and the Netherlands: Why are election rallies in Europe important?]” 12 March. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39247859 (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006. “Occidentalism, the Very Idea: An Essay on Enlightenment and Enchantment.” *Critical Inquiry* 32(3): 381-411.

Buruma, Ian and Avishai Margalit. 2004. *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies*. New York: Penguin Books.

Euben, Roxanne L. 1999. *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gluck, Carol. 2011. “The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now.” *The American Historical Review* 116(3): 676-687.

Göle, Nilüfer. 2015. *Islam and Secularity: The Future of Europe’s Public Sphere*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Gurcan, Metin. 2017. “The Rise of the Eurasianist Vision in Turkey.” *Al-Monitor*, 17 May. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/05/turkey-rise-of-euroasianist-vision.html (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Gürbey, Sinem. 2009. “Islam, Nation-State, and the Military: A Discussion of Secularism in Turkey.” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the*

Middle East 29(3): 371-380.

Gürdoğan, Ersin. 1991. *Görünmeyen Üniversite* [The unseen university]. Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık.

Hanafi, Hassan. 2008. "From Orientalism to Occidentalism." In *Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue: Essays in Honour of Professor Tuomo Melasuo on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday*. ed. Kirsi Henriksson and Anitta Kynsilehto, 257-265. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute.

Hendrick, Joshua D. 2018. "A Turkish Red Herring? The Production and Consumption of Fethullah Gülen as 'Good Islam.'" In *Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why*. ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balcı, 287-308. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press.

Hoffer, Eric. 2002 [1951]. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

İnsel, Ahmet. 2017. "Prof. Nilüfer Göle: Kemalizm, Müslüman Laikliğin En Gelişmis, Evrenselleşmiş Biçimi" [Professor Nilüfer Göle: Kemalism is the most developed, universalized form of Muslim secularism]. *T24*, 16 February. http://t24.com.tr/haber/prof-nilufer-gole-kemalizm-musluman-laikligin-en-gelismis-evrensellesmis-bicimi,389112 (Accessed 1 February 2018).

Jenkins, Gareth. 2011. "Ergenekon, Sledgehammer, and the Politics of Turkish Justice: Conspiracies and Coincidences." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 15(2): 1-9.

Kardam, Nükhet. 2015. *From Ottoman to Turk and Beyond: Shimmering Threads of Identity*. Online book, 18 November. http://ottomantoturk.middcreate.net/core/preface/ (Accessed 5 July 2020).

Kimya, Fırat. 2019. "Political Economy of Corruption in Turkey: Declining Petty Corruption, Rise of Cronyism?" *Turkish Studies* 20(3): 351-376.

Koru, Fehmi. 2017. "Hollanda'da İktidara Seçim Kazandıran Kavga Bize Referamdumda 'Evet' Olarak Yansırsa.... [If the fight in the Netherlands that won the election for the government comes back to us as a "yes" vote in the referendum...]" *Fehmi Koru'nun Günlüğü* [Fehmi Koru's journal], 18 March.

https://fehmikoru.com/hollandada-iktidara-secim-kazandiran-kavga-bize-referandumda-evet-olarak-yansirsa/ (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Kubicek, Paul. 2020. "Faulty Assumptions about Democratization in Turkey." *Middle East Critique* 29(3): 245-257.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2003. "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism." *American Anthropologist* 104(3): 766-775.

Medyascope TV. 2021. "Talha Hakan Alp ile Söyleşi: Türkiye'de İnsanlar Neye, Niçin ve Nasıl İnanıyorlar? [A conversation with Talha Hakan Alp: What do people in Turkey believe, why, and how?]" 22 November. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-alirHAct1c (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Milliyet. 2013. "'İki Ayyaş' Sözüne O Açıklık Getirdi [Party spokesperson clarifies the "two drunks" comment]." 29 May. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/iki-ayyas-sozune-o-aciklik-getirdi-1715794 (Accessed 31 December 2021).

————. 2015. "4 Bakan İçin Yüce Divan Yolu Kapandı" [Path to supreme-court inquiry blocked for four ministers]. 20 January. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/4-bakan-icin-yuce-divan-yolu-kapandi-2001253 (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Özkök, Ertuğrul. 1998. "Fethullah Gülen-Papa Buluşması" [A meeting between Fethullah Gülen and the Pope]. *Hürriyet*, 7 February. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/fethullah-gulen-papa-bulusmasi-39005400 (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2018. *The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Samar, Kamuran. 2021. "Faruk Acar, 'Ömer'in Yolu' Slonganına Gelen Eleştirilere Ne Diyor [Faruk Acar on the "Umar's path" controversy]." *Euronews*, 15 November. https://tr.euronews.com/2021/11/15/omer-in-yolu-slogan-n-n-mimar-faruk-acar-iyi-parti-kampanyas-na-gelen-elestirilere-cevap-v (Accessed 31 December 2021).

Sayyid, S. 2015. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*.

3rd ed. London and New York: Zed Books.

――――. 2017. “Political Islam in the Aftermath of ‘Islamic State.’” *ReOrient* 3(1): 65-82.

Sawae, Fumiko. 2002. *The Reorientation of the Islamists in Turkey: An Analysis of “Pro-Islamic Journals” in the 1990s*. Islamic Area Studies Working Paper Series, no. 28. Tokyo: Islamic Area Studies Project.

――――. 2005. *Democracy and Islam in Modern Turkey*. Kyoto: Nakanishiya Shuppan (In Japanese).

――――. 2017. “The Condition of the Post-Kemalist Public Sphere in Turkey.” *Sophia Journal of Asian, African, and Middle Eastern Studies* 35: 181-201.

――――. 2020. “Populism and the Politics of Belonging in Erdoğan’s Turkey.” *Middle East Critique* 29(3): 259-273.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shryock, Andrew. 2010. “Introduction.” In *Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend*. ed. Andrew Shryock, 1-25. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Subaşı, Necdet. 2010. “The Alevi Opening: Concept, Strategy and Process.” *Insight Turkey* 12(2): 165-178.

Tittensor, David. 2018. “Secrecy and Hierarchy within the Gülen Movement and the Question of Academic Responsibility.” In *Turkey’s July 15th Coup and the Gülen Movement*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balcı, 217-236. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press.

Türkmen, Buket. 2013. “The New Islamist Domination in Turkey: Occidentalism Toppled.” In *Turkey between Nationalism and Globalization*. ed. Riva Kastoryano, 107-122. London and New York: Routledge.

Vakil, AbdoolKarim. 2010. “Is the Islam in Islamophobia the Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; or, When Is It Islamophobia Time.” In *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*. ed. S. Sayyid & AbdoolKarim Vakil, 22-43. London: Hurst & Company.

Volpi, Frédéric. 2010. *Political Islam Observed.* London: Hurst & Company.

White. Jenny. 2011. *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*.

Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2020. *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

————. 2021. *Erdoğan: The Making of an Autocrat.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Bayram Balci, ed. 2018. *Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Yetkin, Murat. 2019. "Türkiye'de Kaç Kürt, Kaç Sünni, Kaç Alevi Yaşıyor? [How many Kurds, Sunnis, and Alevis live in Turkey?]." *Yetkin Report*, 18 November.
https://yetkinreport.com/2019/11/18/turkiyede-kac-kurt-kac-sunni-kac-alevi-yasiyor (Accessed 31 December 2021).