- ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
This paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions. Our model unifies stochastic stability analysis in static settings, including normal form games, network formation games, and simple exchange economies, as stochastic stability analysis in a class of interactions in which agents unilaterally and jointly choose their strategies. We embed a static setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise their strategies based on the improvements that the new strategy profile offers them. In addition to the optimization process, there are persistent random shocks on agents' utility that potentially lead to switching to suboptimal strategies. Under a logit specification of choice probabilities, we characterize the set of states that will be observed in the long-run as noise vanishes. We apply these results to examples of certain potential games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 19
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- DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005
- ISSN : 0899-8256
- eISSN : 1090-2473
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000347021500006