論文

査読有り
2014年11月

Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
  • Ryoji Sawa

88
開始ページ
90
終了ページ
111
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005
出版者・発行元
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE

This paper examines a dynamic process of unilateral and joint deviations of agents and the resulting stochastic evolution of social conventions. Our model unifies stochastic stability analysis in static settings, including normal form games, network formation games, and simple exchange economies, as stochastic stability analysis in a class of interactions in which agents unilaterally and jointly choose their strategies. We embed a static setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise their strategies based on the improvements that the new strategy profile offers them. In addition to the optimization process, there are persistent random shocks on agents' utility that potentially lead to switching to suboptimal strategies. Under a logit specification of choice probabilities, we characterize the set of states that will be observed in the long-run as noise vanishes. We apply these results to examples of certain potential games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 19

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000347021500006&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005
  • ISSN : 0899-8256
  • eISSN : 1090-2473
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000347021500006

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