論文

査読有り
2012年8月

Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
  • Ryoji Sawa

41
3
開始ページ
489
終了ページ
496
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG

We examine an evolutionary model in which the mutation rate varies with the strategy. Bergin and Lipman (Econometrica 64:943-956, 1996) show that equilibrium selection using stochastic evolutionary processes depends on the specification of mutation rates. We offer a characterization of how mutation rates determine the selection of Nash equilibria in 2 x 2 symmetric coordination games for single and double limits of the small mutation rate and the large population size. We prove that the restrictions on mutation rates which ensure that the risk-dominated equilibrium is selected are the same for both orders of limits.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 1

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000306289400003&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1007/s00182-011-0299-1
  • ISSN : 0020-7276
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000306289400003

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