論文

査読有り
2018年11月1日

Prospect dynamics and loss dominance

Games and Economic Behavior
  • Ryoji Sawa
  • ,
  • Jiabin Wu

112
開始ページ
98
終了ページ
124
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006

© 2018 Elsevier Inc. This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game. When an agent revises her strategy, she compares the payoff from each strategy to a reference point. Under the resulting dynamics, called prospect dynamics, risk-dominance is no longer sufficient to guarantee stochastic stability in 2 × 2 coordination games. We propose a stronger concept, loss-dominance: a strategy is loss-dominant if it is risk-dominant and a maximin strategy. In 2 × 2 coordination games, the state where all agents play the loss-dominant strategy is uniquely stochastically stable under prospect dynamics for any degree of loss-aversion and all types of reference points. For symmetric two-player normal form games, a generalized concept, generalized loss-dominance, gives a sufficient condition for stochastic stability under prospect dynamics.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 10

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000454371800006&DestApp=WOS_CPL
URL
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85052870489&origin=inward
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006
  • ISSN : 0899-8256
  • SCOPUS ID : 85052870489
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000454371800006

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