講演・口頭発表等

国際会議
2016年5月

Achieving Sustainable Cooperation in Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma with Observation Errors

2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
  • Sigenaka F
  • ,
  • Yamamoto S
  • ,
  • Seki M
  • ,
  • Sekiguchi T
  • ,
  • Iwasaki A
  • ,
  • Yokoo M

記述言語
英語
会議種別
ポスター発表
主催者
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
開催地
Singapore, Singapore

A repeated game is a formal model for analyzing cooperation in long-term relationships. The case where each player observes her opponent's action with some observation errors (imperfect private monitoring) is difficult to analyze, and existing works show that cooperative relations can be sustainable only in ideal situations. We deal with a generic problem that can model both the prisoner's dilemma and the team production problem. We examine a situation with an additional action that is dominated by another action. By adding this seemingly irrelevant action, players can achieve sustainable cooperative relations far beyond the ideal situations. Moreover, for a two-player case, the obtained welfare matches a theoretical upper bound.

リンク情報
URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2937141