1999年8月
Bargaining with imperfect commitment
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
- 巻
- 28
- 号
- 2
- 開始ページ
- 217
- 終了ページ
- 237
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1998.0700
- 出版者・発行元
- ACADEMIC PRESS INC
We study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two-person bargaining games. By establishing the reputation for being stubborn, a player sometimes commits to her initial demand, becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent. When the probability of being stubborn is small, the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness. A player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and/or is more likely to be stubborn. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1006/game.1998.0700
- ISSN : 0899-8256
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000081929900005