論文

査読有り
2013年8月

Edmund Husserl in Talcott Parsons: Analytical Realism and Phenomenology

HUMAN STUDIES
  • Mitsuhiro Tada

36
3
開始ページ
357
終了ページ
374
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s10746-013-9277-x
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER

This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons's analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, The Structure of Social Action, Parsons positively referred to Husserl's Logical Investigations. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 1

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-013-9277-x
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000323667100003&DestApp=WOS_CPL
URL
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10746-013-9277-x