翻　訳

Tokyo 2020 Emblem Problem and Sociological Description:
Focus on the Way of Making and Using Designs (English version)

KASHIMA Takashi

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to describe the emblem problem of the Tokyo 2020 Games sociologically. Previous research has analysed Internet communication, but this paper explains the emblem problem from a historical context. First, the relationship between designers and the Olympics (the way of making), then the relationship between advertising agencies and the Olympics (the way of using), and then the relationship between the designers and advertising agencies over the Olympics. After that, I will consider the two issues of 'Plagiarism of design' and 'Selection process of the emblem' and reveal what happened in the emblem problem of the 2020 Tokyo Games. This paper is an English translation of a paper that appeared in the Annual Review of Sociology (No. 33, 2020, the Kantoh Sociological Society, JAPAN, https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/130008077449).

1. Introduction

The 'emblem problem' refers to the series of events wherein the official emblems for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games (hereinafter, the Tokyo Games) generated a storm of debate online, leading to the withdrawal of the logos about a month after they were unveiled.[1] At the heart of this controversy were questions surrounding the originality of the emblem design—whether it was plagiarised—and the emblem selection process—whether it was fixed. Although Tokyo's organising committee and the designer, Sano Kenjirō, did not admit to these two points of contention, they decided to withdraw the logos having determined that the approval of the Japanese public had been lost. In this article, I present an analytical description of the emblem problem before exploring it in connection with media work research.[2]

2. Prior research and approach to the problem

　　　　　Research on the emblem problem includes studies that explore the phenomenon of online flaming (hereinafter, flaming). According to Tanaka Tatsuo and Yamaguchi Shinichi, flaming is defined as a 'deluge of highly aggressive, one-sided comments directed against the speech or behaviour of a certain person', wherein 'dialogue-based discussion cannot materialise, and any attempt to initiate discussion merely results in further damage'. Therefore, 'When flaming occurs frequently, people refrain from commenting', and 'in online public opinion, there is an increase in extreme views, as only some more powerful individuals, who are not discouraged by the flaming, continue to disseminate information online' (Tanaka & Yamaguchi 2016: i). As data, Tanaka and Yamaguchi used changes in the number of Twitter posts in the Olympic emblem flaming incident (aggregation of search results) and a list of examples purported online to have been plagiarised by Sano, regarding the emblem problem as the 'largest flaming incident' in Japan. They also noted that 'The problem here is that discussion has not been realised', stating, 'If there had been an honest discussion of the matter online, a fruitful debate would likely have prevailed' (Tanaka & Yamaguchi 2016: 66).

　　　　　However, this study only highlights the failed state of discussion vis-à-vis the flaming incident and does not address the emblem problem or clarify the circumstances of those involved in it. Therefore, in this article, I focus on the fact that the flaming did not cease even after expert opinions were provided. According to Fukui Kensaku, 'In the Olympic emblem uproar, there was a gap between the expert opinion that "copyright infringement is unlikely" and the "plagiarism claim" that seemed to hold sway online'. Furthermore, Fukui considered that differences between the views of experts and the reactions of the public were 'only natural', explaining, 'Without crossing the line of legality, there is a plethora of "free comment among the people", a sphere that is entrusted to "market" forces' (Fukui 2016). In other words, consensus in the discussion around copyright infringement is highly unlikely, and the constant state of contention itself constitutes a form of order.

　　　　　From the above, two positions can be supposed. The first regards flaming as a failure of discussion and sees the lack of consensus in public opinion as a problem. The second regards flaming as a form of discussion and sees the state of non-consensus as a product of the people. The difference between the two positions is a question of how one views the state that arises during a flaming incident, and the latter has been the subject of sociological accounts (Maeda et al. 2007: 91).

3. Methodology

　　　　To delineate the context, a distinction is made between the 'way of making' and 'way of using' emblems. The 'way of making' refers to the way in which designers should create the emblem (design theory). The 'way of using' refers to the way in which advertising agencies employed by the organising committee should use the emblem commercially (marketing theory). This distinction is applied to draw attention to the fact that emblems are both devices created by their designers and devices used by those involved in advertising. This article examines the histories of the 'way of making' logos pursued by designers and the 'way of using' logos pursued by advertisers—as well as the relation between these two endeavours in the context of emblems. By contextualising the problem in terms of the relationship between the designers and the Olympics; the relationship between the advertising agencies and the Olympics; and the tripartite relationship among the designers, the advertising agencies, and the Olympics, it should also be possible to examine the contentious issues of whether the logos were plagiarised and whether the selection process was fixed.[3]

4. History of the 'way of making' logos

　　　　First, it is important to note that Olympic marks[4] and marks used for the World Expositions held in Japan were treated in the same way by designers. Therefore, the selection method for the mark used in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was also used for the 1970 Japan World Exposition (hereinafter, Osaka Expo), and points of reflection on the mark selection for the Osaka Expo were used in the selection of the mark for the 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo. With this in mind, let us examine the history of the 'way of making' logos.

　　　　The mark for the Tokyo Olympics that were scheduled to be held in 1940 was designed by Hiromoto Taiji and selected from a total of 12,113 public entries. However, it would appear that the organising committee at the time considered that any kind of mark that represented the event would suffice, and it did not go as far as considering what kind of mark was required. Therefore, provided that the design featured three rings on the top and two rings underneath, it was even acceptable to place the national flag on top of the Olympic symbol. Moreover, Hiromoto's proposal, which represented a sports stadium, was supplemented with three track lines by Hirokawa Matsugoro of the judging committee, and it was this revised version that was eventually selected (Figure 1).[5]

　　　　For the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, a selection competition was held, in which

entrants were selected by representatives from the design industry, and a design proposal by Kamekura Yusaku was chosen from six entries. Although there is a rumour in Japanese design history that Kamekura hastily compiled his design two hours before the deadline,[6] a review of the history around that time[7] shows that, in fact, Kamekura also submitted another design for the competition, which closely resembled the mark used in the 1940 Tokyo Olympics (Figure 2). It seems that Kamekura's logo was intended to represent the sun; however, many people saw the large, red circle as the Hinomaru, Japan's national flag.

　　　　The design competition for the 1970 Osaka Expo was also a selection-based affair headed by representatives from the design industry, and a design by Nishijima Isao was chosen from proposals by 15 individuals and two groups. However, the proposal by Nishijima selected by the judging committee was rejected by the executive committee, prompting a rerun of the competition and the selection of a design by Ōtaka Takeshi. Nishijima's proposal was rejected because it was 'abstract and lacked popular appeal' and, as one committee member stated, 'Expos are an extremely popular affair, enjoyed by children, farmers, and so on, so I don't think we can go with something that is only understood by a certain group of intellectuals' (to the chair of the expo association, the design appeared to resemble a family crest).[8] Ōtaka's design was then chosen because the five marks could be viewed as a 'cherry blossom' (Figure 3). Moreover, the *Asahi Shimbun* highlighted a resemblance concerning Ōtaka's design in an article titled 'The Cherry Blossom Expo Mark: Similar Design in the United States' (22 September 1966, morning edition). While the Osaka Expo is often described as a success, the logo selection was beset with problems.

　　　　For the 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo, a more carefully configured selection-based competition was held, and a design by Nagai Kazumasa was chosen from eight proposals. According to Nagai, this mark was made by separating the upper and lower parts of the logo used for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and inserting a snowflake design between these. However, the design was criticised as scientifically unsound, and Nagai and the organising committee were forced to respond.

　　　　Three points can be drawn from this history of the 'way of making' logos. First, the process of selecting logos is quite problematic. Design proposals solicited from the public were revised, selected designs were rejected, and further problems were raised after designs were selected through reruns. Although marks were considered necessary for the Olympic Games and Japan's Expositions, the question of what kind of mark was suitable was addressed only after the marks had been proposed. Second, it was difficult to reach a consensus on how the marks were to be interpreted. The logo for the Tokyo Olympics, which was intended to represent the sun, was viewed as a depiction of

Japan's national flag. The logo for the Osaka Expo (Nishijima's design), which was intended to represent a state of harmony between the East and the West, was viewed as a family crest. Even if the 'way of making' a logo is explained by an expert, there is no guarantee that the public, or the client, will interpret the work along the same lines. Third, efforts to discover plagiarism in designs had been underway since the 1960s. During the year that the resemblance of the Osaka Expo mark (Ōtaka's design) was highlighted, claims of 'misappropriation' also surfaced concerning the designs of stamps issued by the Ministry of Posts and a poster calling for entries for the Tokyo Summer Universiade.[9] In this way, controversial exchanges around the 'way of making' logos were already seen before the surfacing of the emblem problem.

1. 1940年東京大会マーク
上が原案、下が修正案
Mark for the 1940 Tokyo Olympics
Top: Original proposal
Bottom: Revised version

2. 1964年東京大会マーク
右が決定案、左はもう一つの亀倉雄策案
Mark for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics
Right: Final version
Left: Other proposal by Kamekura

3. 1970年大阪万博マーク　1972年札幌冬季大会
上は西島案、下は大高案　　　　　　マーク
Mark for the 1970 Osaka Expo
Top: Proposal by Nishijima
Bottom: Proposal by Ōtaka
Right: Mark for the 1972 Sapporo
Winter Olympics

4.

Figures 1 and 2: Tokyo Olympics.
Figure 3: Osaka Expo and Sapporo Winter Olympics. Figure 4: Nagano Winter Olympics

5. History of the 'way of using' logos

First, it is important to note that until 1980, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) did not allow the Olympic Games to be used for commercial purposes. Hence, one host city experienced financial difficulties and faced debts after the Games had finished (1976 Montreal Olympics). Then, after a decrease in the number of cities bidding for the Olympics in the late 1970s, from the 1980s, the IOC began to work with advertising agencies as a last-ditch measure. With this in mind, let us examine the history of the 'way of using' logos.

This history can be traced back to the misuse of marks. The problem began with the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics. In Japan, during the 1936 Berlin Olympics, miscellaneous goods featuring the Olympic design were released as 'fashion goods' during the event, [10] causing a commotion as the items were recalled. Next, during the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, unauthorised use of the logo became a social problem, [11] and the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) was forced to respond. Then, during the 1977 Sapporo Winter Olympics, certain organisations were permitted to use the logo for a fee, as a measure to prevent misuse, and for the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Max Planck Society was entrusted with the management of the logo.

The IOC changed its policy in the 1980s. First, the words for the designs was changed from 'mark' to 'emblem', and commercial use was permitted as a means of gathering funds. This involved the use of advertising agencies, and as efforts to gather sponsors ensued, importance came to be placed on the way in which the emblems were used, i.e. their marketing value (this began with the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics).

This 'way of using' the emblems continued in a similar fashion during the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano. In 1989, the JOC became independent from the Japan Amateur Sports Association to secure its own revenue. Moreover, in 1993, to gather funds for the Nagano Winter Olympics, the JOC established Japan Olympic Marketing in partnership with Dentsu and Mitsubishi Corporation. Thus, the emblem for the Nagano Olympics was the first to be selected after the marketing system was established.

The emblem selection involved two advertising agencies and two design consultancy firms, who chose a design proposed by Landor Associates (Shinozuka Masanori). Known as the 'snow flower', each component of the emblem could be seen to represent an athlete, while the emblem as a whole was presented as a snow crystal, an alpine flower or the idea of gathering in the centre and spreading out to the world, creating a strong sense of integrity with the concept of the event (Figure 4). [12] Moreover, the marketing programme developed by the advertisers ensured thorough and effective management of the emblem, from trademark registration to monitoring for unauthorised use. Thus, the first instance wherein the 'way of using' was determined first and the 'way of making' had

to conform to this was the emblem for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics.

Three points can be drawn from this history of the 'way of using' logos. First, marks and emblems are different as the purpose of an emblem is to generate funds. Second, an Olympic marketing system was established following the success of the Los Angeles Games. The IOC concluded a contract with an advertising agency (International Sports and Leisure, ISL) and introduced The Olympic Partner sponsorship programme, which commenced for the Seoul Summer Olympics and Calgary Winter Olympics in 1988. Third, since the Olympics was now a conglomeration of sponsors, designers were required to provide designs that were suitable for commercial use. In an emblem, sponsors prefer to seek usability in marketing over the artistic dimension of design. Exchanges surrounding the 'way of using' emblems have since developed in such a way around advertisers with organisational capacity and flexibility.

6. Identification of context

The order is important here: trial and error in the 'way of making' came first, and the 'way of using' came to be considered afterwards. It is clear from the history of the 'way of making' that the process of selecting marks was fraught with problems and that it was difficult to produce a consensus on how marks were to be interpreted; moreover, efforts to detect plagiarism in marks were made from the 1960s. The history of the 'way of using' also shows that as a response to financial difficulties, the term 'mark' was changed to 'emblem', a system of Olympic marketing was established, and designs that were suitable for commercial use came to be required. In other words, during the period when designers focused on the 'way of making' to promote their designs, problems often arose, but after the 'way of using' was planned in advance by the advertisers, problems in the 'way of making' could now be avoided beforehand.

In this article, I consider these developments as a shift in focus from the 'way of making' to the 'way of using'. In fact, from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics to the 1972 Munich Olympics, the selection processes emphasised the 'way of making' marks, and designers still describe this period as a 'golden era'. However, around the time of the 1976 Montreal Olympics, media coverage and appraisal of the 'way of making' marks ceased. Then in the 1980s, advertisers began to positively appreciate the 'way of using' emblems, paving the way for a new wave of criticism: against Olympic commercialism.

It is important to note that this shift from the 'way of making' to the 'way of using' also became a source of discontent among designers, who emphasised artistic value, toward advertisers, who emphasised marketing value. As we will see, for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, Japanese designers were not afforded the kind of role they had

been in previous years, and on numerous occasions, designers lauded Kamekura Yusaku's mark for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics as the ideal embodiment of a logo. These developments then set the context for the involvement of designers in selecting the emblem for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics.

7．The 'plagiarism' issue

So how does the context outlined above relate to the emblem problem? First, the issue of whether the emblem was plagiarised was instigated by a surge of online allegations that the emblem for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics resembled the logo of the Théâtre de Liège in Belgium (Figures 5 and 6). In response to this, designer Sano Kenjirō held a press conference (5 August 2015) where he explained that the 'design approaches' were 'totally different' as the emblem comprised a 'T' and a 'circle' and the Théâtre de Liège logo comprised a 'T' and an 'L'. It should be noted here that in response to the problem of how the emblem should be viewed, Sano explained how it was created. In other words, Sano considered that the contentious issue could be dealt with by explaining his 'way of making' the emblem.

However, this explanation of the 'way of making' was insufficient to clear away the suspicion. Here. it is important to note that marketing representatives from the organising committee—the client for the emblem design—had also commented, focusing on 'the way of using' the emblem. For example, in the press conferences held on 24 July and 5 August, representatives showcased the emblem's 'potential for expansion', unveiling nine possible configurations with the help of a video (Figure 7). However, as this 'potential for expansion' concerned 'ways of using' to be leveraged by event officials, who had exclusive rights to the use of the emblem, it failed to generate much interest among the public and went largely unreported and unappraised by experts.

Accordingly, it can be said that, when the emblem was the subject of plagiarism allegations, it was not defended on the basis of how it would be used—including its capacity for expansion into video form—but only on the basis of how the static image was created. Consequently, attention came to focus only on the resemblance issue, resulting in the flaming incident, and further attempts to detect plagiarism were made as a way of fanning those flames. (The 'way of making' the emblem was explained; an issue surrounding a tote bag came to light; an apology was made over this issue; further suspicions ensued; the original draft of the emblem was revealed and an image that resembled the original draft was put forward.) In response to these events, Sano stated, 'The uproar has become so severe that it has been reported that all of my works are also imitations, and in addition to this, even designs that I never even made are being

presented to the world as plagiarised works of Sano Kenjirō'.[13] This would seem to suggest that because Sano's response to the plagiarism issue focused on his 'way of making' the emblem, an exchange developed around the 'way of making' emblems in which doubts were cast on the ways in which Sano had developed other designs.

The reason for this line of thinking is that a different kind of response was given when the emblem for the 2012 London Olympics (Figure 8) became the subject of flaming. Although the London emblem looked very different from conventional designs and received mixed reviews, it went largely unreported in Japan, with only a few comments from experts. The interesting point here is that despite a range of criticism against the emblem, the organising committee continued to pursue a marketing approach characterised by a statement such as, 'It's not a logo, it's a brand' and 'The emblem is flexible and will evolve over the next five years'.[14] In other words, in response to the flaming incident, London continued to focus on the way the emblem would be used, rather than the way it had been made.

However, Tokyo's response was to focus on the way the emblem was made, which ultimately resulted in it being withdrawn. The problem here is why, in the first place, did the Tokyo Olympics focus on the 'way of making' the emblem rather than the 'way of using' it. In fact, this point is closely related to the second issue of whether the selection process was fixed, which is discussed below.


Figure 5: Sano Kenjirō's design. Figure 6: Théâtre de Liège. Figure 7: Part of the video showing how the emblem could be expanded. Figure 8: London Olympics. Figure 9: Slide presented at an organising committee press conference

8. The 'selection fixing' issue

　　　According to an explanation by the organising committee (28 August), the emblem for the Tokyo Olympics was selected through an 'individual competition' in which 'Rather than ordering the design of an emblem from an advertising agency, or using a design company, as was the case for London and Rio, skilled designers from Japan and overseas could participate on the strength of their individual talents'. Moreover, Takasaki Takuma, who was also a member of the organising committee's selection panel, stated that the emblem selection process would 'serve as an opportunity to improve the current standard of Japanese design'.[15]

　　　We have already noted the shift in focus from the 'way of making' marks to the 'way of using' emblems. However, for some reason, the explanation by the organising committee cited above appears to extend special consideration to designers. In a slide presented by the organising committee on the same day, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics mark, the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics mark, and the 2020 Tokyo Olympics emblem are placed side by side; however, the emblem used for the Nagano Winter Olympics is missing (Figure 9).

　　　From the above, it would seem important to consider what kind of relationship existed during the emblem selection process between the designers, who focus on the 'way of making', and the advertisers, who focus on the 'way of using'. At that time, there was speculation in the media that the selection process had been fixed by the advertisers.[16] Takasaki, a member of the selection committee, was on loan from the company Dentsu, and was reported to have also been in charge of the tote bag problem for which Sano apologised; therefore, the selection fixing issue was assumed to be attributable to the advertisers, whose focus was on the 'way of using' the emblem. (It was suspected that Takasaki had run the selection with only Sano's design in mind.)

　　　However, if we read the report into the emblem problem (December 2015) while paying attention to interplay between the 'way of making' and the 'way of using',[17] we can see that in reality individuals from the design industry were also closely involved in the selection process. One person who played an important role in that process was Nagai Kazumasa, head of the selection committee and designer of the mark used for the Sapporo Winter Olympics. Nagai's involvement can be summarised as follows: (1) Nagai, who was well acquainted with the 'way of making' marks, was in a position of leadership over Maki Hidetoshi of the organising committee's marketing agency, who was well acquainted with the 'way of using' emblems. (2) In that position of leadership, Nagai selected six designers and Takasaki selected two, to whom requests to participate in the open design competition were sent. (3) It was Nagai, not Takasaki, who selected Sano to receive a request. (4) Nagai also gave advice on how to handle the selection and sought to grant the eight hand-picked designers automatic advancement to the second round of

selection. (5) Maki was aware of the problem with Nagai but faced a situation in which he could not ignore Nagai's wishes if the selection was to proceed smoothly.

Although this report acknowledged irregularities and inappropriate conduct in the selection process, it concluded that the selection was not rigged for Sano Kenjirō alone, at which time attention turned to the organising committee advertisers Maki and Takasaki, who were involved in the irregularities.[18] However, it was Nagai who selected Sano to be invited to join the competition, and in addition to this, Nagai made a variety of other requests. This suggests that Nagai's intentions were fundamental to the question of whether the selection was fixed, while Maki and Takasaki played a mediating role in that process. In other words, the issue of whether the selection was rigged was not a problem created by the advertisers but rather emerged as a result of attempts to accommodate the intentions of designers. (To avoid the use of special treatment for the eight designers, Maki and Takasaki ended up adjusting the votes in the first round of the selection.)

So why did all this happen? As this article focuses on the relationship between the 'way of making' and the 'way of using' designs, the Nagano Winter Olympics is crucial to our understanding of this question. On this point, Nagai stated, 'From Tokyo up until Sapporo⋯ I think the design system worked splendidly. Unfortunately, when it came to the Nagano Olympics⋯ there were some excellent individual designs, but there was a lack of overall cohesiveness. Since this was a great loss, for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, we will need to develop a system that ensures the designs are cohesive'.[19] Reflecting on the Nagano Winter Olympics, design critic Kashiwagi Hiroshi makes a similar point: 'The visual impression was disjointed', highlighting the need to 'also form a comprehensive team in the area of design for the next Tokyo Olympics'.[20] The above points suggest that there was a sense of crisis because a repeat of the Nagano Winter Olympics failure, where the designs lacked cohesion in an artistic sense, had to be avoided at all costs, which caused the designers to maintain a close involvement in the emblem selection process.

For these reasons, it would seem that the underlying error of the emblem problem was to combine the 'current way of using emblems', which emphasises marketing value, with the 'former way of making marks', which continued to emphasise artistic value. As marketing experts in the organising committee also sought the cooperation of designers who knew a lot about the traditional 'marks', it also became necessary to extend consideration to designers in the selection of 'emblems', for which marketing value is important; then, as the spotlight came to focus only on the advertisers, who coordinated the intentions of the designers, it became impossible to circumvent claims

that the selection process was rigged. This article takes the view that it was this consideration extended to designers by those involved on the marketing side that enabled a situation in which the 'way of making' the design was used as the basis in dealing with the plagiarism issue. It would also seem that it was because the 'way of making' and the 'way of using' were related that the response to plagiarism allegations became prolonged, and the issue of whether the selection process was fixed was not easily resolved.

9. Work-study in media

This article has highlighted a shift in focus from the 'way of making' to the 'way of using' designs, reframing the emblem problem, with reference to its historical context, as a series of practices undertaken by the individuals involved. As a result, two points have been clarified: First, the plagiarism issue could have been dealt with by focusing on the 'way of using' the design (a difference from research on flaming); second, with regard to the issue of whether the selection was fixed, if the designers had not enacted their intentions, there would have been no problematic behaviour on the part of the advertisers (a difference from the media coverage). This article has examined actual exchanges around the emblem problem separately from any judgements of whether the emblem was plagiarised and whether the selection process was rigged.

This final section considers how the emblem problem can be connected to work-study in the field of media. According to Korenaga, 'In the domain of media, at the point where work is produced, the focus is on demonstrating unique expertise in areas such as design, whereas at the point where that work is actually accepted, understanding takes its cues from commonplace norms. If the former is viewed as production work, and the latter as interpretation work, activities such as criticism of media, which has become conspicuous in recent years, might be viewed as a point of conflict in these two types of work'.[21]

Following this reasoning, several aspects of the present discussion can be viewed as 'both types of work'. For example, the mark for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics which was designed to depict the sun was viewed by the public as a depiction of Japan's national flag. The Osaka Expo mark which represented a state of convergence between East and West (Nishijima's design) was viewed by the client as a 'family crest'. The mark used for the Sapporo Winter Olympics, which represented a snow crystal, was criticised as being scientifically unsound. Thus, when designing a mark, the practical question of how the design will be viewed is critical. The processes of 'viewing' and 'using concepts'

are interconnected, and it is possible to view the same design in different ways depending on what concept is invoked. Therefore, the question of how multiple perspectives informed by common sense knowledge might converge would seem to have become the focal point in the practice of designing marks—separately from technical explanations of design. (The group of five circles in Ōtaka's design for the Osaka Expo could be viewed as a cherry blossom without the need for a technical explanation.)

Furthermore, ethnomethodology research would suggest that responding to, or participating in, flaming is first and foremost a problem that pertains to those involved in the flaming incident. In ethnomethodology research, it is considered that, separately from defining the word 'suicide' correctly, people who can use the concept of 'suicide' know in advance the criteria for distinguishing it from other forms of death (death due to illness, etc.), and it has been proposed that, 'It is our description of the procedure used when classifying a death as suicide that is of great interest to sociology' (Maeda et al. 2007: 38-44).

If we follow this line of reasoning, we can consider how we are still able to use the word 'plagiarism' without knowing exactly how it is defined (the requirements for copyright infringement). For example, we understand the term 'plagiarism' through differentiation from other expressions, such as 'parody' or 'homage'. Depending on whether we describe an apparently similar expression as 'parody' or 'homage', or as 'plagiarism', the object is viewed in a completely different light. In the case of a parody or homage, the focus is on the intention behind the expression—the sentiments it embodies. In the case of plagiarism, the reason why it was done is brought into question. Then, when this reason is questioned, people may be surprised by the explanation given, and those who did not notice the issue may be criticised. Further to this, a person may intentionally avoid the description of 'plagiarism' to avoid questions about the reason. Both those who use the description of 'plagiarism' and those who avoid it know in advance that the description is used in distinction from other descriptions. This is why the question of how an expression is presented becomes the focal point of practice. Thus, the question of 'how plagiarism is distinguished from other concepts' becomes an issue.[22]

Although this is omitted from the present discussion, Kashima 2017 examines Sano Kenjirō's explanations of the emblem production process and presents a detailed analysis focusing on the degree to which common sense knowledge was invoked in explanations provided by an expert. The emblem that was allegedly plagiarised was, for Sano, a 'homage' to the mark used for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Furthermore, Sano explained that the emblem in question consisted of a 'T' and a 'circle' and was made in a different way from the logo of the Théâtre de Liège, which combined a 'T' and an

'L'. In this way, the practical consideration of how to explain a design has a significant bearing on the design process, and the question of how to explain the design convincingly—with recourse to common sense knowledge—to clients who do not necessarily possess technical knowledge can be seen as the focal point in design practice.

In view of the above, two points of connection can be drawn with the practice of work-study in media. The first is the focus on a bipartite relationship between senders and receivers, or production work and interpretation work. The second is the placement of intermediaries between senders and receivers and the focus on a tripartite relationship among production work, intermediary work, and interpretation work. The rationale for focusing on the relationship between the 'way of making' and the 'way of using' designs in this article stems from an interest in the role of the intermediary. Marks and emblems are expressions created by designers, but they are also forms of media to be used by clients and viewed by receivers. When viewed in this light, one can distinguish how designs are viewed by clients from how they will be viewed by receivers (flaming incidents around the depiction of women, etc.), and it is possible to envisage workplace studies in the media industry which focus on editors and producers as intermediaries (participant observation, interviews, etc.).

However, the question of how to collect data is not easily answered. In the case of the emblem problem, it was not possible to access the individuals involved. It is difficult, in the first place, for sociologists to be present in the fields where designs are actually developed, and unless we are to prepare an experimental environment, the most likely place for clues to be found is the presentation stage. This is because presentations provide the context in which designers—experts in the 'way of making' designs—explain their designs to the people who are interested in the 'way of using' them.[23] Therefore, if we can analyse what is done, and how it is done, in these settings (analysis of interactions around presentations), it should be possible to enrich the quality of work-study in media.

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[1] The emblems were unveiled on 24 July 2015 and withdrawn on 1 September 2015.

[2] Note that since the aim of this article is to explore points of connection between Kashima 2017 and work research, there are certain points of overlap with this existing study. For the sake of brevity, the reader is referred to Kashima 2017 for individual data and illustrations. Work research is research which uses concrete descriptions of practices developed in a certain setting to clarify how the activities of people involved in that setting are organised (Maeda et al. 2007: 91).

[3] Relevant materials were collected, and the two bipartite relationships are reframed as a tripartite relationship (Kashima 2018).

[4] At this point, the designs were known as 'marks', but they were later referred to as 'emblems' (assuming commercial use).

[5] 'Daimaru no shinshin dezainā' [Daimaru's up-and-coming designer], *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, 10 July 1937, morning edition.

[6] National Museum of Modern Art, Tokyo (ed.), *Design Project for the Tokyo 1964 Olympic Games.* Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, 2013, p. 18.

[7] Katsumi, M. 'Orinpikku no māku ni tsuite' [About the Olympic marks], *Design.* Tokyo: Bijutsu Shuppansha, August 1960.

[8] 'Minutes of the 3rd Executive Committee Meeting', Nippon bankokuhakurankai kōshiki kiroku Shiryōshū bessatsu [Official Records of the Japan World Exposition: Reference Materials]. Japan Association for the 1970 World Exposition, 1971, pp. 280-281.

[9] 'Mohō dezain ni hansei o' [Time to Reflect on Imitation Designs], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 20 July 1966, morning edition; 'Mata yoku nita dezain' [Yet another very similar design], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 13 August 1966, morning edition.

[10] 'Mondai no gorin moyō Afureru orinpikku kibun' [The problematic Olympic logo: Olympic mood overflows], *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 August 1936, morning edition.

[11] 'Gorin māku Shōnin no ranyō fusegu' [The Olympic mark: Prevent abuse by merchants], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 7 June 1959, morning edition.

[12] 'Dai 18-kai orinpikku tōki kyōgi taikai kōshiki hōkokusho dai 1-maki keikaku to shien' [Official survey report on the 18th Winter Olympic Games, Volume 1, Planning and Support] Nagano Winter Olympic Games Organising Committee, 1999, p. 98.

[13] Sano, K. 'Emuburemu ni tsukimashite' [About the emblem], *MR_DESIGN*, 1 September 2015.

[14] "London 2012 team defend new logo". BBC SPORT. 5th June 2007. http:

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[15] Takasaki, T. 'Tōkyō 2020 gorin enburemu o kangaeru' [Considering the Tokyo 2020 Olympic emblem], *Brain*, October 2015.

[16] ' "Emburemu" shinsa o "Sano Ken" deki-rēsu ni shita Dentsū no waru' [Dentsu scoundrel who fixed the 'emblem' selection for 'Ken Sano'], *Shukan Shincho*, 17 September 2015.

[17] 'Shiryō 6-2 Kyū enburemu senkō katei nikansuru chōsa hōkokusho' [Material 6-2: Survey report on the selection process of the old emblem], *The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games*, 18 December 2015.

[18] Maki and Takasaki adjusted the votes in the first round to ensure that the eight hand-picked designers advanced to the second round.

[19] Nagai, K. '1964-nen Tōkyō orinpikku to genzai' [1964 Tokyo Olympics and the Present], Tokyo Design 2020 Open Session: Vol. 1, 31 October 2013.

[20] 'Tōkyō gorin Dezain 1964-nen to 2020-nen' [Tokyo Olympic Designs: 1964 and 2020], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 October 2013, morning edition.

[21] Korenaga, R. 'Hataraku keiken e no apurōchi - Media o meguru wāku: Seisaku kara juyō made -' [Approach to working experience - Work around media: From production to acceptance], http://kantohsociologicalsociety.jp/congress/67/points_themeA.html

[22] This paragraph draws on Maeda 2015.

[23] Although access to such settings is also likely to be restricted, in the case of the emblem problem, an analysis was possible because Sano Kenjirō explained the production process at a press conference.