2007年
Periodical resource allocation using approximated combinatorial auctions
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE/WIC/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGY (IAT 2007)
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- 開始ページ
- 434
- 終了ページ
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- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(国際会議プロシーディングス)
- DOI
- 10.1109/IAT.2007.35
- 出版者・発行元
- IEEE COMPUTER SOC
Combinatorial auction, one of most popular market mechanisms, is well-known mechanism for effective resource allocation to self-interested agents. In real scenarios, since the auction mechanism has to clear the market very frequently, actually there is not enough time to compute exact optimal winners. In this paper we show that some approximation algorithms provide sufficient quality of winners for auctions that have large number of bids but have hard time constraints. Furthermore, we compare and discuss about desirable properties of such approximation algorithms to be embedded in application systems.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1109/IAT.2007.35
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000252477900077