2021年5月
Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- ,
- ,
- 巻
- 30
- 号
- 2
- 開始ページ
- 449
- 終了ページ
- 455
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1111/jems.12410
- 出版者・発行元
- Wiley
We investigate a firm's pre-emptive behavior by comparing Cournot competition and Stackelberg games with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has access to private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre-emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg leader) to simultaneous quantity choice (Cournot firm) if and only if the firm is ignorant of the market size compared to the other firm. The firm's decision in terms of production timing is always detrimental to producer surplus in the industry. It is beneficial to consumer surplus in duopoly competition, but detrimental when there are many competitors in the market.
- リンク情報
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- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12410
- Web of Science
- https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000598473600001&DestApp=WOS_CPL
- URL
- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jems.12410
- URL
- https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full-xml/10.1111/jems.12410
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1111/jems.12410
- ISSN : 1058-6407
- eISSN : 1530-9134
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000598473600001