2017年5月
Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
- ,
- ,
- 巻
- 420
- 号
- 開始ページ
- 53
- 終了ページ
- 67
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.033
- 出版者・発行元
- ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
We consider the evolution of fairness and coalition formation in a three-person ultimatum game in which the coalition value depends on its size. Traditional game theory, which assumes selfish and rational players, predicts the largest and efficient coalition with a proposer exploiting most of the total value. In a stochastic evolutionary model (the frequency-dependent Moran process with mutations) where players make errors in estimating the payoffs and strategies of others, evolutionary selection favors the formation of a two-person subcoalition under weak selection and in the low mutation limit if and only if its coalition value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest coalition. Proposers offer 30-35% of the subcoalition value to a coalition member, excluding a non-member. Multilateral bargaining is critically different from the bilateral one. Coalition-forming behavior may cause economic inefficiency and social exclusion. Stochastic evolutionary game theory thus provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person ultimatum game.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.033
- ISSN : 0022-5193
- eISSN : 1095-8541
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000400952700008