2015年6月
A Political Economy Model of Earnings Mobility and Redistribution Policy
Journal of Public Economic Theory
- ,
- 巻
- 17
- 号
- 3
- 開始ページ
- 346
- 終了ページ
- 382
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1111/jpet.12112
- 出版者・発行元
- WILEY-BLACKWELL
This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique equilibrium where unskilled, low-income agents support a low redistribution because of the hope of upward mobility in future. In contrast, the economy attains multiple equilibria when mobility opportunity and risk are low: one is an unskilled-majority equilibrium defined by low mobility and the other is a skilled-majority equilibrium defined by high mobility. The paper gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the social planner's allocation in terms of mobility, and shows that the skilled-majority equilibrium realizes mobility close to the optimal one.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1111/jpet.12112
- ISSN : 1097-3923
- eISSN : 1467-9779
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000354194400004