Tatsuya SASAKI

J-GLOBAL         Last updated: Jul 18, 2017 at 20:14
Tatsuya SASAKI
F-Power inc.
Risk Management
Twitter ID


From 2009 to 2012 Tatsuya Sasaki worked at the Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. He was a participant in the 2008 IIASA Young Scientists Summer Program, and returned to IIASA in May 2009 to continue his research on co-evolution of cooperative investment and voluntary participation in public goods games. In December of 2012, he accepted a second appointment as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Vienna to investigate the emergence of sanctioning institutions with Prof. Dr. Karl Sigmund. Since June of 2014, Tatsuya has started the project "Joint evolution of indirect reciprocity and voluntary participation" supported by Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P27018-G11.

Tatsuya's work lies at the application of mathematics to biology and social sciences. His primary interests include evolutionary dynamics, evolution of cooperation, liberty and openness, origin of sociality (norms, institutions, etc.), and conflict resolution.

Tatsuya graduated from Osaka University in Japan in 1996 with a master's degree in complex algebraic geometry (supervisor: Kazuhiro Konno) and a bachelor's degree in mathematics. Following graduation he joined Okazaki Shinkin Bank, Japan, where his work was mainly involved with risk management. From 2004 to 2009 Tatsuya participated in a PhD course covering information systems science at Soka University (supervisor: Tatsuo Unemi), Japan, where he studied the evolution of cooperation numerically and analytically, and in spring of 2010, received his doctorate degree.

Tatsuya Sasaki was a worker of the ESF European Collaborative Research (EUROCORES) Programmes “The Evolution of Cooperation and Trading (TECT)”.
- TECT Workshop "Evolution of Cooperation Models and Theories", 15-18 September 2009, IIASA, Austria. http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/EEP/TECT/

Published Papers

Yamamoto H, Okada I, Uchida S, Sasaki T
Scientific reports   7 44146   Mar 2017   [Refereed]
Sasaki T, Okada I, Nakai Y
Scientific Reports   7 41870   Feb 2017   [Refereed]
Tatsuya SASAKI
Games   8(1) 8   Jan 2017   [Refereed]
Sasaki T, Okada I, Nakai Y
Biology Letters   12(7) 20160341   Jul 2016   [Refereed]
Chen X, Sasaki T, Perc M
Scientific Reports   5 17050   Nov 2015   [Refereed]
Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective,...
Tatsuya SASAKI
Games   6(4) 574-587   Nov 2015   [Refereed]
Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stabilit...
Okada I, Yamamoto H, Toriumi F, Sasaki T
PLoS Computational Biology   11(5) e1004232   May 2015   [Refereed]
Social dilemmas, in which an individual profits from selfishness, unless the whole group chooses the selfish option, have long provided an academic challenge. A new study publishing in PLOS Computational Biology theoretically analyzes the effects ...
Sasaki T, Okada I
BioSystems   131 51-59   Apr 2015   [Refereed]
Sasaki T, Uchida S, Chen X
Scientific reports   5 8917   Mar 2015   [Refereed]
X. Chen, T. Sasaki, A. Brannstrom, U. Dieckman
Journal of The Royal Society Interface   12(102) 20140935   Dec 2014   [Refereed]
Free to access.


Tatsuya Sasaki, Åke Brännström, Isamu Okada, Tatsuo Unemi
   Feb 2015
Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known
options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the
co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are
not well understood. Her...
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Yutaka Nakai
   May 2016
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation
among unfamiliar individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional
cooperation according to social norms that discriminate the good (those who
deserve to be rewarded ...
Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida, Voltaire Cang, Xiaojie Chen
   Nov 2014
In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle
is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Recent
game-theoretical studies show that pool punishment, in particular second-order
punishment, plays ...
Tatsuya Sasaki, Tatsuya Sasaki
Dynamic Games and Applications   4 345-362   Jan 2014
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly ...
How ‘first carrot, then stick’ incentives promote cooperation
Sasaki T, Chen X, Brännström A, Dieckmann U
IIASA 40th aniversary coference poster session      Oct 2012
Web page of IIASA 40th aniversary coference

Research Grants & Projects

Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P27018-G11 Einzelprojekte
Project Year: Jun 2014 - May 2017    Investigator(s): Tatsuya SASAKI