In explaining altruistic cooperation and punishment, the challenging riddle<br />
is how transcendental rules can emerge within the empirical world. Recent<br />
game-theoretical studies show that pool punishment, in particular second-order<br />
punishment, plays a key role in understanding the evolution of cooperation.<br />
Second-order pool punishment, however, is tautological in nature: the<br />
punishment system itself is caused by its own effects. The emergence of pool<br />
punishment poses a logical conundrum that to date has been overlooked in the<br />
study of the evolution of social norms and institutions. Here we tackle the<br />
issue by considering the interplay of (a) cognitive biases in reasoning and (b)<br />
Agamben&#039;s notion of homo sacer (Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power<br />
and Bare Life. Stanford Univ. Press), that is, a person who may be killed<br />
without legal consequence. Based on cognitive disposition of reversing the<br />
cause-and-effect relationship, then we propose a new system: preemptive<br />
punishment of homo sacers. This action can lead to retrospectively forming<br />
moral assessment in particular for second-order pool punishment.