論文

査読有り
2017年11月27日

Game theoretical modeling of information supervisory control

2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2017
  • Yasuo Sasaki
  • ,
  • Naoshi Uchihira

2017-January
開始ページ
2285
終了ページ
2290
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(国際会議プロシーディングス)
DOI
10.1109/SMC.2017.8122961
出版者・発行元
IEEE

© 2017 IEEE. This paper provides a game theoretical characterization of information supervisory control problems. Information supervisory control deals with indirect control of human behavior by controlling information distribution. For an arbitrary game, we consider an agent outside the game called a supervisor. It can provide the players with information about the game, which results in change in their information structures and hence possible outcomes. The supervisor's controllability is defined as its ability to achieve the players' behaviors as intended. We present a general model and then analyze its particular class which we call state-dependent team collaborations. We discuss the possibility of information supervisor as a decision support system in such situations.


リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/SMC.2017.8122961
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000427598702056&DestApp=WOS_CPL
Scopus
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85044378450&origin=inward
Scopus Citedby
https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85044378450&origin=inward

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