2020
An Approach for Attacking Speck on Microcontroller with Correlation Power Analysis.
Proceedings - 2020 8th International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops, CANDARW 2020
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- First page
- 368
- Last page
- 372
- Language
- Publishing type
- Research paper (international conference proceedings)
- DOI
- 10.1109/CANDARW51189.2020.00076
- Publisher
- IEEE
In recent years, some lightweight cipher algorithms for IoT devices have been proposed. These algorithms can be applied to a variety of IoT devices without occupying too much memory and power consumption, and compared to traditional ciphers, such as AES, these algorithms have higher efficiency. The Speck algorithm is a lightweight block cipher, proposed by the NSA in June 2013, and it is specifically optimized for IoT microcontrollers. A few previous studies have shown that the Speck algorithm can be attacked through power analysis. Based on Arduino Uno as the implementation platform of the Speck 128/128 algorithm, in this paper, we propose a method to attack the Speck 128/128 algorithm. Our experiment results have shown that when the attack point in the last round of Speck 128/128 XOR operation, the round key can be successfully recovered by the Correlation Power Analysis attack.
- Link information
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- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW51189.2020.00076
- DBLP
- https://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/conf/ic-nc/TangIKN20
- URL
- https://dblp.uni-trier.de/conf/ic-nc/2020w
- URL
- https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/ic-nc/candar2020w.html#TangIKN20
- Scopus
- https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85102200089&origin=inward
- Scopus Citedby
- https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85102200089&origin=inward
- ID information
-
- DOI : 10.1109/CANDARW51189.2020.00076
- DBLP ID : conf/ic-nc/TangIKN20
- SCOPUS ID : 85102200089