2018年7月
Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
- ,
- 巻
- 449
- 号
- 開始ページ
- 94
- 終了ページ
- 102
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.027
- 出版者・発行元
- ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
Cooperation among seif-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated n-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implementation error with a guarantee that the resulting payoff will be no less than any of the co-players'. By enumerating strategic possibilities for n = 3, we show that such a strategy indeed exists when its memory length m equals three. It means that a deterministic strategy can be publicly employed to stabilize cooperation against error with avoiding the risk of being exploited. We furthermore show that, for general n-person public-goods game, m >= n is necessary to satisfy the above criteria. (C) 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
- リンク情報
-
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.027
- arXiv
- http://arxiv.org/abs/arXiv:1804.06984
- Web of Science
- https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000432644700009&DestApp=WOS_CPL
- URL
- http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.06984v1
- URL
- http://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.06984v1 本文へのリンクあり
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.027
- ISSN : 0022-5193
- eISSN : 1095-8541
- arXiv ID : arXiv:1804.06984
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000432644700009