2020年8月
Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
- ,
- 巻
- 10
- 号
- 1
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x
- 出版者・発行元
- NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP
In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner's dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful strategy, we mean that it constitutes a cooperative Nash equilibrium under implementation error, with assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than the co-players' regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small. Although we have a list of actions prescribed by each successful strategy, the rationale behind them has not been fully understood for the iterated public-goods game because the list has hundreds of entries to deal with every relevant history of previous interactions. In this paper, we propose a method to convert such history-based representation into an automaton with a minimal number of states. Our main finding is that a successful strategy for the iterated three-person public-goods game can be represented as a 10-state automaton by this method. In this automaton, each state can be interpreted as the player's internal judgement of the situation, such as trustworthiness of the co-players and the need to redeem oneself after defection. This result thus suggests a comprehensible way to choose an appropriate action at each step towards cooperation based on a situational judgement, which is mapped from the history of interactions.
- リンク情報
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- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x
- arXiv
- http://arxiv.org/abs/arXiv:1910.02634
- Web of Science
- https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000561428300025&DestApp=WOS_CPL
- URL
- http://arxiv.org/abs/1910.02634v3
- URL
- http://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.02634v3 本文へのリンクあり
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x
- ISSN : 2045-2322
- arXiv ID : arXiv:1910.02634
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000561428300025