2022年5月21日
Parental transfers under ambiguity
Applied Economics Letters
ダウンロード
回数 : 48
- 巻
- 29
- 号
- 9
- 開始ページ
- 773
- 終了ページ
- 779
- 記述言語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1080/13504851.2021.1885605
- 出版者・発行元
- Informa {UK} Limited
This note introduces parental uncertainty into parent–child monetary transfers. A parent questions the probability distribution of a child’s future economic success. As a result, the parent endogenously tilts his/her subjective probability model away from an approximating probability model. In this case, parental transfers increase with model uncertainty, thereby reducing the child’s effort and probability of economic success. This theoretical result raises several empirical questions, of which two are as follows. For one thing, informed parents (e.g. those who hold the same job as their child) transfer less money, and their child exerts more effort. Another is that economic uncertainty (e.g. recessions or pandemics) prompts higher parental transfer payments and reduces the child’s effort.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1080/13504851.2021.1885605
- ISSN : 1350-4851
- eISSN : 1466-4291
- ORCIDのPut Code : 88764103