2008年3月
Heterogeneous contests and less informative signals
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW
- ,
- 巻
- 59
- 号
- 1
- 開始ページ
- 113
- 終了ページ
- 126
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00385.x
- 出版者・発行元
- BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
We consider rank-order contests with heterogeneous agents in which the principal is restricted to using a fair contest (or a symmetric contest), focusing on the optimal accuracy of output signals. As opposed to the absolute performance evaluation, we show that it is optimal for the principal to deliberately make the signals noisier according to the degree of heterogeneity. Some economic interpretations of controlling noise are discussed.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00385.x
- ISSN : 1352-4739
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000253256700009