2013年
A dynamic mechanism for LQG power networks with random type parameters and pricing delay
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
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- 開始ページ
- 2384
- 終了ページ
- 2390
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(国際会議プロシーディングス)
- DOI
- 10.1109/CDC.2013.6760237
- 出版者・発行元
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called utility
a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. We discuss designs of the mechanism that integrates strategic determinations of private controls by the agents into the optimal public controls that achieve the optimal social welfare and rational agents can accept. The model of this paper is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks, which is motivated by so-called average system frequency models
in each model of the agents, we includes the type parameter presenting each agent's private information
we also consider the time delay in calculation of prices by utility. Assuming that each private cost functional as well as the public cost functional is quadratic, we derive formulas of the pricing schemes, and the incentive cost, inspired by the pivot function in the mechanism design theory literate from economics, that characterize our mechanism design in both formulations of the fixed horizon control and the receding horizon control cases. © 2013 IEEE.
a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. We discuss designs of the mechanism that integrates strategic determinations of private controls by the agents into the optimal public controls that achieve the optimal social welfare and rational agents can accept. The model of this paper is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks, which is motivated by so-called average system frequency models
in each model of the agents, we includes the type parameter presenting each agent's private information
we also consider the time delay in calculation of prices by utility. Assuming that each private cost functional as well as the public cost functional is quadratic, we derive formulas of the pricing schemes, and the incentive cost, inspired by the pivot function in the mechanism design theory literate from economics, that characterize our mechanism design in both formulations of the fixed horizon control and the receding horizon control cases. © 2013 IEEE.
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1109/CDC.2013.6760237
- ISSN : 0191-2216
- SCOPUS ID : 84902330276