2005年
応用科学哲学の問題としてのリスク
科学哲学
- 巻
- 38
- 号
- 2
- 開始ページ
- 77
- 終了ページ
- 91
- 記述言語
- 日本語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.4216/jpssj.38.2_77
- 出版者・発行元
- The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
The practice of risk analysis and its validity have invited heated controversies for many years. In this paper, I approach this issue from the point of view of "an applied philosophy of science". Two common models of risk analysis, i.e. the positivist and the social constructivist models, seem untenable because they reflect positions already refuted in the philosophy of science. Kristine Shrader-Frechette and Deborah Mayo offer alternative post-positivistic models of the risk analysis (scientific proceduralism and a metascientific analysis, respectively). Although I agree with them in many respects, their images of uncertainty in the risk analysis seem to be somewhat coarse-grained. I introduce a Bayesian point of view as a refinement in the post-positivistic model.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.4216/jpssj.38.2_77
- ISSN : 0289-3428
- CiNii Articles ID : 130003640621
- CiNii Books ID : AN00037482